Appellate Decisions Edited by Mark E. Herman


Mark E. Herman, of the Law Office of William G. Koldner, PA of Baltimore is a member of MTLA’s Board of Governors and is a member of its President’s Club as a Supporter. Mr. Herman is certified in trial advocacy by the National Board of Trial Advocates. He is also a member of the Baltimore City Bar Association and is an arbiter/mediator on its Fee Arbitration Committee.


Civil Procedures


Res judicata – California state suit re- moved to federal court on ground of diversity – suit dismissed in federal court as time-barred – suit re-filed in Mary- land state court and dismissed on ground of res judicata – preclusive effect of fed- eral judgment determined by federal law – federal rule of procedure 41 (b) – fed- eral dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits – re-filing of lawsuit in Maryland after California dis- missal of suit barred by res judicata.


Facts: In 1997, Semtek International filed suit against Lockheed Martin in Califor- nia state court for breach of contract and tort claims. Suit was removed to Califor- nia Federal court based on diversity, and that court dismissed the complaint as barred by the two-year statute of limita- tions. That ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Following the dismissal in California fed- eral court, Semtek re-filed the same claims in Maryland state court under Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations. Lockheed removed the action to the Maryland federal District Court, but that action was returned to Maryland state court because federal jurisdiction was improper. In the Circuit Court for Balti- more City, the trial court dismissed the Maryland action on grounds of res judi- cata. Semtek argued on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that the action was barred.


Held: Judgment affirmed. The preclu- sive effect of a federal judgment is determined by federal law, specifically Federal Rule of Procedure 41 (b). That rule and the explanatory case law (par- ticularly including Shoup v. Bell & Howell, 872 F.2d 1178 (4th


Thompson Trucking Inc. v. Dorsey Trailer, Inc., 870F. 2d 1044 (5th


Cir. 1989) and Cir.


1989)), determine that a dismissal on stat- ute of limitations grounds operates as a dismissal on the merits. Maryland courts are required, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U. S. Constitution,


Winter 2000


to extend full faith and credit to a judg- ment of a federal court sitting in another state as surely as they will give full faith and credit to a judgment of the state court itself. The doctrine enunciated in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), was not applicable and, therefore, not violated because Semtek’s challenge was before the Maryland state court and not a federal court sitting in diversity; the Erie doctrine applies only to federal and not to state courts. Accordingly, the earlier dismissal of the suit by the California federal dis- trict court was a judgment on the merits and was entitled to the preclusive effect that the Maryland trial judge gave it.


Semtek Inernat’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 1041, Sept. Term 1998, filed September 7, 1999. Opinion by Moylan, J.


Health Claims Arbitration


Pleadings


Facts: On December 23, 1991, Mrs. Nam, who was then more than eight months pregnant, went to a Montgom- ery County hospital with complaints of nausea, vomiting, a high fever, and a poor appetite. She was referred to a nurse who diagnosed a flu of several weeks duration. The nurse recommended bed rest and Tylenol. Mrs. Nam returned to that hos- pital emergency room later that night in full labor. The baby was born on Decem- ber 24 in cardiac arrest.


remained in a vegetative state until her ultimate death on September 9, 1992. On August 12, 1994, Mr. and Mrs.


Nam filed a claim in Health Claims Ar- bitration Office (HCAO) against Montgomery County, Montgomery County General Hospital, Emergency Medicine Associates, P.A., and “John Doe, M.D.” The Nams’ claim alleged actions in wrongful death, negligence, survival, and loss of consortium stemming from the allegedly negligent medical care pro- vided to Mrs. Nam on December 23. In the answer to interrogatories, the Nams


Trial Reporter


learned that Lizzie James, R.N. was the medical person who had provided Mrs. Nam with the alleged negligent care. This was confirmed in August of 1995, when the Nams deposed Ms. James. In Octo- ber of 1995, the parties filed a joint election to waive arbitration to the cir- cuit court which ultimately was granted. In January of 1996, the Nams filed an order in the circuit court stating that they were dismissing with prejudice defendant “John Doe, M.D.” In February, the Nams filed another order dismissing all remain- ing defendants but Montgomery County. In March, Montgomery County filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of govern- mental immunity. In April, Nams filed a motion to stay the circuit court proceed- ings and filed an amended claim in HCAO naming John Doe, MD., as Lizzie James, R.N. The panel chairman of the HCAO filed an order that the election to waive arbitration did not include John Doe, M.D., but that the amended claim did not relate back to the initially filed claim. Thus, the amended claim was barred by the applicable statute of limita- tions. The circuit court then granted the County’s motion to dismiss on grounds of governmental immunity.


The child


Held: Affirmed. Maryland does not rec- ognize “John Doe” pleadings, but does recognize the doctrine of “relating back.” An amended complaint that corrects the name of a party will relate back; one that adds a new party will not. The test in deciding which of the these two alterna- tives is applicable is 1) who was the intended party, and 2) whether the party was on notice of her status as a party de- fendant. Under the facts of this case, it was not clear from the Nams’ actions that they intended to sue Ms. James, as evi- denced by their failure to earlier amend their claim when they learned of Ms. James and by filing a motion to dismiss with prejudice John Doe, M.D. More- over, Ms. James never had notice of her intended defendant status, even though Montgomery County, her employer, had notice of the suit. The Court of Special Appeals also held that although the Local


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