Only the combination of functional safety and cybersecurity ensures the overall safety of industrial plants. Stefan Ditting and Thomas Janzer report.
Nur die Kombination von funktionaler Sicherheit und Computer- und Netzsicherheit ermöglicht die Gesamtsicherheit von Industrieanlagen. Stefan Ditting und Thomas Janzer berichten.
Seule l’alliance entre sécurité fonctionnelle et cybersécurité garantit la sécurité générale des installations industrielles. Stefan Ditting et Thomas Janzer témoignent.
Safety and security first
P
Malware and computer virus attacks on the networks of industrial plants are increasing.
Source: HIMA Paul Hildebrandt.
roductivity has the highest priority for companies. It is generally acknowledged that functional safety protects systems and
thus helps maintain this productivity. Autonomous safety controllers also help to significantly reduce security risks and thus reduce lifecycle costs. Properly setting up the safety controller is the last line of defence against cyber attacks. As cyber attacks on plants via
networks increase, it becomes essential for functional safety and safety-related automation solutions to support cybersecurity. The trend of linking office IT with automation IT in an open network architecture only increases the security risks to plant automation. There is good news. SIL 3 controllers
designed especially for functional safety include features that are also quite helpful for cybersecurity protection. The basic requirements that current
and future security standards impose on the integration of safety controllers, and how autonomous safety systems (such as HIMax from Paul Hildebrandt) can help reduce the risk, are presented below. Functional safety is the basis for any type of process plant, since without
mastery of the functional safety risks, operation of the plant is not allowed. In addition to safety, productivity is a crucial factor for the enterprise. To ensure productivity a safety system must be integrated in the plant process control system. However, such integration increases the risk that safety products will be negatively influenced via interfaces and networks. An attack on the integrity of the safety controller also jeopardises the integrity of functional safety. Consequently, the same demanding requirements imposed on functional safety features must also be imposed on the security features of a safety controller.
Integrated solution At first glance, economic reasons can be a persuasive factor for implementing an integrated safety system from the same company that manufactured the process control system. After all, a uniform system concept and a common bus, as well as a single engineering tool for the standard automation and functionally safe automation, promise several advantages. The advantages of convenience, however, come with disadvantages in the areas of functional
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