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awe” as possible, a cyberattack is a si- lent, insidious process designed to do its work in secret. Often, the damage is done before network administrators realize it took place. And even though computer attacks are becoming more frequent, it’s still usually diffi cult to determine the identity of the attacker. In a recent attack thought to be the work of a Russian hacker group, three industrial control networks were in- fected with malware that would have allowed them to sabotage the systems had the attack not been identifi ed. CYBERCOM’s job is to prevent these kinds of attacks on DoD net- works, but that’s only part of its mission; increasingly, its operatives are going on the off ensive. The same vulnerabilities that can compromise DoD systems exist on those of our adversaries and can be exploited in the same way. If an enemy’s missile control system could be penetrated, for example, the threat could be nul- lifi ed without fi ring a shot. To that end, experts in “vulnerability discov- ery” are currently in high demand at CYBERCOM and the NSA.


A good off ense Their work is evident in initiatives such as Operation Olympic Games,


a still-unacknowledged cyberattack that allegedly planted a virus called Stuxnet, which damaged centri- fuges in Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. While defending net- works from cyberattack is still im- portant, the concept of “cyberspace superiority,” an edge that gives warfi ghters key advantages in situ- ational awareness and other areas, is rising to the fore. Compromising or destroying an enemy’s computer and communication systems before a U.S. off ensive would give service- members a big tactical advantage, without risking lives. One of the ways computer systems can be compromised is by using “ze- ro-day” exploits — fl aws in a system’s software that are as yet undiscov- ered. Those chinks in a computer’s armor allow CYBERCOM operators to implant viruses and other bits of malware that can take over a system or render it inoperative. Understand- ably, zero-day exploits are highly sought after by DoD, especially when they involve the computer systems of our adversaries. The Defense Advanced Research


Projects Agency (DARPA) is usu- ally on the leading edge of new military technology, and that’s true in the case of cyberwar as well. The agency’s Plan X, announced in 2012, aims to create revolutionary technologies to enable the military to more fully utilize cyberspace. One part of the program involves creating situational awareness tools integrating physical and cyber ele- ments on the battlefi eld and mak- ing them available to commanders. That way, a warfi ghter will know not only where the enemy is and what weapons they’re using but also whether they’re communicat- ing via cellphone or Wi-Fi — virtu- ally “mapping” the digital battlefi eld in cyberspace. DARPA will begin to implement Plan X at DoD and CYBERCOM in October 2017.


As traditional weapons increase in capability and sophistication, so will the weapons and tactics of cyberwar. CYBERCOM will be at the forefront on this newest battlefi eld.


MO


— Mark Cantrell is a North Carolina- based freelance writer. His last feature article for Military Offi cer was “Camo- fl awed,” May 2014.


Hacker Techniques


Hackers can disrupt and control a remote computer system by several methods.


 Distributed denial of service attack: over a period of time, infecting a large number of com- puter systems with a virus that enables them to seize control and turn them into “zombie” systems. At an arranged time, the control- lers command the computers to all access the same website at once, making it inaccessible.  Semantic attack: planting inac- curate information into a computer system so it seems to operate nor- mally but produces false results. The Israeli Air Force employed this kind of attack in 2007, disrupting the Syrian air defense system be- fore making an air strike on a Syr- ian nuclear facility.  Syntactic attack: using malicious software such as viruses, trojans, and worms to infect a computer system. These types of malware replicate themselves inside a sys- tem and easily can spread to other computers attached to the network.  Social engineering: tricking people into compromising their system’s security — for example, getting them to click on a Web link that loads a virus or divulge personal information through a fraudulent website.


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