designed to support operations at no more than 500 miles from our Atlantic coast. To make matters worse, the endurance of Canadian
warships is at historical low levels. To cap it all off, the support capabilities of either of Canada’s naval bases are inadequate for the entire fleet. While it would be possible to concentrate the entire
fleet in the Pacific in very short order, logistical limita- tions would cripple such a plan. The RCN concentrated its fleet at Halifax during the Second World War but the naval dockyard had a woefully limited capacity to repair, modernize and support even its small peacetime fleet. Ships lay idle waiting for a myriad of things, rang- ing from important to trivial, while the operating forces at sea were often forced to retire for want of fuel. Many ships had to be repaired or modernized in the United States. The key to becoming a credible presence in the Pa-
cific Ocean has far less to do with moving a few ships around than it does with logistics priorities in naval planning. In a strategic sense, the RCN’s main operat- ing base at Esquimalt must have sufficient capacity to support the fleet; if not the whole fleet at once, then the majority of it. This will result in major expansions to both the physical capacity of the base plus the re- serve stocks of spare parts, fuel, ammunition and other consumable commodities. All of these are currently at
HMCS Algonquin returning to port.
perilously low levels. In an operational sense, the ability to deploy a major
fleet and air unit to a forward operating base such as Guam will necessitate the creation of a robust naval supply organization, something the RCN has never put much effort into and which the Canadian Forces is unlikely to see as valuable. Additionally, replenishment ships are the most im-
portant operational force multiplier in naval warfare. Just getting by with the minimum number of them is a recipe for disaster. As the recent accident has shown, having two ships with half the capacity is better than one with twice that, especially if the single ship is dam- aged or, worse, lost to a smart enemy. Tactically, the navy needs to understand that the fuel
capacity of its ships is inadequate. New classes of ships must incorporate the most fuel-efficient propulsion systems and substantially greater fuel capacity. If they do not, they may be moved to Esquimalt but will not be able to operate very far from it for very long or at very high speed. As General Omar Bradley said, “Amateurs study
tactics, professionals study logistics.” While this is gen- erally true, it is especially important when considering a Canadian strategic pivot to the west and planning RCN fleet operations in the Pacific Ocean.
n
Photo:
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