Fig. 1. During the period from 1993 through the end of 2008, GM North America reduced the rate of re- cordable incidents by 94%. The GM metalcasting facilities exhibited similar trends during that period.
tory for the manager and staff. Te safety supervisor’s role was to facilitate the meeting and provide the informa- tion needed to accomplish the agenda. Te local UAW shop chair co-led the PSRB, and the local union leadership was invited to participate in the agenda. Plants were encouraged to make the meetings more strategic by spending more time on planning initiatives for safety process improvement. Minutes were published so the entire plant workforce could see the leadership direction for workplace safety. Second, Safety Observation Tours
Fig. 2. During the period from 1993 through 2008, GM North America reduced its lost workday case rate by over 97%. The GM metalcasting facilities exhibited similar trends during that period.
mance. Late in the third quarter of 1994, GM directed that each manufac- turing unit must reduce its recordable injury rate and lost workday case rate by 50% within three years, based on the 1993 year end rates. To build awareness of the safety culture change, each plant had to implement a visitor protocol safety process, post injury information on a green cross diagram, create a pin map of injuries and adopt the safety absolutes. Te company-wide improve- ments, which are correlated to the metalcasting division improvements, are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. A second committee was estab- lished to develop Phase II of the safety culture change process. Tis committee was chaired by a plant manager but included more safety professionals. Te Phase II committee met frequently at different plants and evaluated various methods to accomplish its goal to give the organization a common approach. Phase II consisted of adopting four
core safety elements at GM. Following is a review of the elements.
The Four Keys Te first element of the safety 28 | MODERN CASTING June 2011
culture change was the creation of a Plant Safety Review Board (PSRB). Te PSRB was vital to keep the key elements of the plant safety program intertwined. Incidents could lead to examinations focused on certain causes, contributing factors and behaviors. For example, after a serious incident in a plant in the GM Powertrain division, which includes the company’s metal- casting facilities, a special procedure for lock out was developed. Many plant managers and other leaders responded that they encountered situations in their plants that made it difficult for workers to comply with the lock out requirements. Tis information lead to modified and improved safety practices, as well as system and equipment design changes, throughout the company. Prior to the implementation of
PSRBs, most GM plants, including its metalcasting facilities, held a monthly safety meeting that was the responsibil- ity of the plant safety supervisor. After Phase II, it was the responsibility of the plant manager to lead or make it clear that safety was a leadership respon- sibility. Te meetings were scheduled monthly, and attendance was manda-
(SOT) replaced traditional leadership safety and housekeeping inspections. SOTs were conducted by leadership— both management and union—on a frequency established during the roll out sessions for each plant. Safety inspections continued, but they focused on specific safety conditions, where SOTs examined the actions of workers. For safety management, field observations provide a comparison between observed performance and established standards. During an SOT, the leader observed workers at their job, and then engaged in conversations about their safety. Te observations were collected by the safety supervisor and presented as aggregate data to the PSRB. Often, the combined observa- tions showed a trend that led to a strategic initiative by the PSRB. Te method and responsibility of incident investigations also changed in the new safety culture. Before the change, some investigations blamed the injured worker or others. Updated incident investigations were designed to establish a root cause and contribut- ing factors based on a detailed factual exploration. To discover root cause, the investigator used the “5 Why’s” technique of asking “why” in succes- sion until a correctable cause could be discovered. Te term “accident” was eliminated, as accidents were believed to just happen without any control, while incidents were caused and could be prevented with proper controls. Supervisors and individual manu-
facturing line organizations were given the responsibility of investigating the incidents and implementing the appropriate corrective actions, and
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