Toxicity threats Close the loophole


We must close the fire safety loophole whereby materials can be developed to pass the BS 8414 test but create large amounts of toxic smoke and possibly debris in the process. The only way to do that is introduce toxicity and debris classifications for the test and modify the test accordingly. Since the introduction of the combustible ban, we have seen a radically different approach from clients and facade designers, including the emergence of a new design team facade consultant present at almost every design meeting in the specification of a new facade. Engineers, in fear of losing their professional indemnity insurance, now ask challenging (and sometimes ridiculous) questions regarding combustibility and the spread of smoke – along with frequent demands of proof that the proposed design will satisfy the new regulations in their strictest interpretation. However, with no accepted test or classification


standards to help us, the cladding industry is lacking the necessary tools to demonstrate compliance. Furthermore, any efforts to introduce such mechanisms are met with stubborn resistance. We have product reaction to fire classifications, such as EN 13501-1, that include smoke classification and a combustible ban that refers to it, so having large scale testing that doesn’t is inconsistent. We must not have a large scale test


standard that allows materials which have large quantities of flame retardant additives to suppress fire growth and not classify the associated production of toxic gases. Accordingly, I propose changes to the BS 8414 test to allow classification along the following lines: F1-Sm2, de0/da1 (Flame(1-5) – Smoke(1-3), Debris(0-3/Damage(0-5)).


Regulatory statement


Fundamental to justifying and driving change in our guidance and test, classification and certification infrastructure is a bold statement at the regulatory level. The most common argument presented against introducing smoke testing and classification is that ‘it is not regulated, therefore shouldn’t require guidance’. I propose that we need new wording to reflect our new painfully obtained understanding of external fire risk along the following lines, in a possible revised B4: • External Fire Spread B4. – (1) The external envelope of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire and smoke, in particular to occupied areas, escape routes and across compartment boundaries


It is no longer sufficient for effective safety to suppress or prevent the spread of fire – we must also prevent the spread of smoke. The combustibles ban has made a huge impact on the way buildings are designed; there is now intense scrutiny of test reports and third party certificates. Culture is changing; nobody dares break a specification now, and we are seeing a constant flow of new innovative products – products that people claimed couldn’t be made non combustible, such as vapour membranes, which now have A2 or even A1 options available. The government must remain resolute. The cost to society of the Grenfell fire has been immeasurable, and the deregulation of health and safety has proven to be a poor investment. It can cost less than 10% of a building’s cost


to make the structure non combustible, and this will further come down as new products and manufacturers enter the market. Cost benefit analyses where the only losers are shareholders should be disregarded. The main losers are firms operating at the lowest standards with poor quality management, no product testing, and the supply chains that value engineer and cut corners to use them. When the USA introduced the 1970 Clean Air


Act, Congress stood firm on its commitment to reduce emissions by 90% despite huge protests from the car industry. Five years later, after billions of dollars of engineering research, the first generation of catalytic converters emerged and changed the world. We sadly lack this historical knowledge, wisdom and leadership. Regulations must reflect the world we want


to live in and not be dictated by what industry purports to be achievable. Necessity is the mother of invention


Jonathan Evans is chief executive officer of Ash and Lacy. For more information, view page 5


The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily of the Fire Protection Association.


References


1. Occupant toxic exposure to fires in rain-screen cladding systems, FPA, 2018, https://www.thefpa.co.uk/fpa-utilities/ download.html?fid=56675DD2-03FE-4411- BCDAFA5B93782E17


2. ‘Fire behaviour of modern facade materials – Understanding the Grenfell Tower fire’, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Volume 368, pp115-123, UCLan, 2019, http://clok.uclan. ac.uk/25831/1/25831_hull.pdf


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