Feature: Software
Figure 2: Borrowing from cloud computing, multiple ECUs can be connected together in the vehicle, allocating processing when and where needed
LynxSecure implements independent
separation kernel executables run on each CPU core, which partitions platform resources into isolated virtual machines (Figure 1), with additional functionality layered on with “subjects” and “guests”. Each additional layer is constrained to a specific virtual machine definition. Te separation kernel precisely defines the virtual machine for each guest, such as hardware rights and privileges, communications paths and hypercall permissions. Engineers define their own systems; there’s no Master, Trusted, Root, Helper, or Service RTOS. Tere is no post- boot modification of memory or other resources assigned to virtual machines, hence no single point of failure. Many markets oscillate between
distributed and centralised computing. Tis push will minimise the cost of sensors and localise more of the processing. Cost and power needs can be driven
down even further. Many systems require just minimal processing most of the time. Borrowing from cloud computing, what if
Instead of the traditional approach of creating different domains for various data-networking protocols, we are seeing zonal architectures
these “systems of systems” – i.e. multiple ECUs connected together in the vehicle – could allocate processing when needed; see Figure 2?
Standards compliance Compliance with relevant safety standards like ISO26262 – and increasingly ISO21434 – is extremely important, whether creating traditional physical automotive components, or, in Lynx’s
50 September/October 2020
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case, virtual ones like hypervisors. We’ve learnt from avionics that it is critical to write detailed requirements documents, with detailed traceability all the way to the fine-grained hardware functionality, which in turn makes verification easier. With spiralling sizes of code bases in the car, the only viable way is to compartmentalise code. Breaking down the code into manageable chunks, issues and source code is key, proving that the operation of a code base is isolated from others and then demonstrating the requirements are met by tracing them to other artefacts, including tests. In our example, use of a full
AUTOSAR-compliant runtime platform, in this case from ETAS, consisting of RTA-OS (operating system for deeply- embedded ECUs), RTA-RTE (AUTOSAR Runtime Environment generator) and RTA-BSW (AUTOSAR-compliant Basic Soſtware). Existing AUTOSAR soſtware can be integrated into a powerful ECU whilst providing the safety, security and freedom from interference required by the most demanding applications.
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