Feature: Software
The attack surface of a software environment is the sum of the diff erent points where an unauthorised user might try to insert or extract data
The processing system Autonomous vehicles, just like aircraſt , demand secure soſt ware platforms, which must be achieved without the massive overheads encountered in avionics. We see multicore heterogeneous processors that feature general-purpose processors, but also potentially GPGPUs, programmable logic, more specialist real-time cores hardware accelerators, and more. From a soſt ware perspective, there’s need to combine rich operating systems (like Linux) on which a wide set of applications can be used almost immediately, with a guaranteed real-time
determinism for certain functions. T e hypervisor layer will need to
simultaneously host safety-critical applications up to ISO 26262 ASIL D, support non-real-time OSs (such as Android and Linux), AUTOSAR (the AUTomotive Open Systems ARchitecture) kernels, and bare-metal applications. In several current systems, diverse
functionality makes them look heterogeneous, but, in reality, they are separate processing systems running diff erent soſt ware. T e shiſt to allocating processing of diff erent tasks more
dynamically, coupled with the industry’s desire to reduce lock-in to a specifi c vendor means that these systems are increasingly using hypervisor technology and executing diff erent operating systems and applications on top of them.
Separation kernel needed Virtualised embedded soſt ware architecture has traditionally placed much of the burden on the hypervisor and/or operating system, which creates platform dependencies, impacting performance (due to extra copies and context switches) and raising challenges due to: • Shared address space; • Shared CPU privileges; • Common arbitration points; • Global resource pools; • Compounding code branches; • Compounding control fl ow timing; • Large co-dependent code base to certify. Now this complexity has changed to
simplicity, with the hypervisor working seamlessly in the background.
Figure 1: LynxSecure implements independent separation kernel executables run on each CPU core
www.electronicsworld.co.uk September/October 2020 49
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