Data acquisition


WHY WATER AND GAS SCADA SYSTEMS MAY BE SOFTER TARGETS THAN POWER GRIDS FOR CYBERHACKING


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There has been a sharp rise in cyberattacks targeting energy, transport and water infrastructure since 2024, according to Industrial Cyber. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) technologies form the backbone of these critical systems, making remote telemetry units (RTUs) essential to both operational performance and cybersecurity. Here, Julian Booth, SCADA service delivery manager at Ovarro, the remote telemetry specialist, explains why water and gas SCADA systems are attractive targets for cyberattackers, and why securing the edge is now central to protecting critical infrastructure.


n water and gas networks, SCADA systems allow operators to monitor assets, track alarms, collect data and support decisions across large, dispersed sites. However, SCADA is not just one central software platform. It also depends on field devices that connect remote assets to the central system. RTUs sit at this critical edge layer, collecting data from remote sites and communicating it back to central SCADA systems. If they are not properly secured, they can become weak points in an otherwise protected architecture.


The consequences can extend far beyond data


loss. In 2021, the BBC reported that a hacker accessed the water system of Oldsmar, Florida, and attempted to increase sodium hydroxide levels in the water treatment process. The incident was spotted and reversed by an operator, but it showed how cyber compromise can move quickly from digital access to physical process manipulation. In water and gas networks, the rise in cyberattacks reported by Industrial Cyber could mean attempted interference with pumping stations, valves, pressure management systems or dosing processes. Even where built-in safeguards prevent a dangerous outcome, the operational,


September 2026 Instrumentation Monthly


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