special focus u Drone detection - Azimuth and vertical coverage angles (similar
argument to that for a radar, as mentioned earlier) - RF DF (direction-finding) capability – as opposed to
omnidirectional or “sector” alarms. RF DF gives a narrow beam (a couple of degrees) that can be used to point in the direction of the drone, and also triangulate in a reasonably precise manner, with two or more RF sensors. With RF sensors generally much longer reaching than radar (up to 5km in a low clutter scenarios), this ability to triangulate on a target without a radar is a significant advantage from a cost perspective - Passive nature - no interference with other
devices, and more difficult to discover by “enemy forces” through RF emissions.
Defeat soLutions
Broadly speaking, the defeat solutions available today include kinetic/“hard kill” (bullets, nets, lasers) and non- kinetic/“soft kill” (jammers, cyber/hacking). It has generally been accepted that soft kill is the
better solution due to lesser collateral damage. Jammers are considered a superior technology to
“hacking” as they are a universal protection – targeting bands on which the drones operate as opposed to relying on having a library of hacks for various communication protocols, each of which can be closed as the manufacturers continue to make the communication links increasingly secure. The jammer works by sending a strong signal on the same
frequency band as the drone uses to communicate with the controller and GPS satellite, forcing the drone to go into a pre-set emergency protocol. This generally involves flying back to the starting point if the GPS connection remains available or landing on the spot is the GPS linkage is also severed. The drones today communicate on 2.4Mhz and
5.8Mhz bands for the most part (for both navigation and video), with some drones utilising 433Mhz and 915Mhz bands. These are considered “unallocated” bands across the world (as opposed to cellphone or emergency broadcast frequencies), and drone manufacturers (along with WiFi, radio frequency- controlled toys, radios etc. manufacturers) are required to stick to those bands by law. Changing the communication band “in a garage” is very difficult for a non-State agent (unlike, changing blades/engine or adding custom payloads). GPS/Glonass jamming is also helpful as an option to
trigger the aforementioned “emergency landing” mode. A common question arises as to what happens to
“autonomous” drones. Severing their RF links will cut the video feed to the operator immediately, and jamming GPS will trigger emergency landing, similar to the normally navigated drone.
controL paneL
An easy to set up, understand and use control console is critical in an environment where the user is not expected to be deeply technical. Good control systems combine the ability to work
completely standalone, and also connect to a cloud for updates and remote assistance if required, in a secure manner.
DroneShield LegaL restrictions
This report does not constitute legal advice, and readers are urged to seek their own advice on legal restrictions regarding purchasing and using counterdrone technology.
Instrumentation Monthly January 2019 45
www.droneshield.com
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