DAVID HESS | OPINION


Nuclear newcomer nations not only want to own their own


nuclear power plants, but most want to build up their capability to construct and operate more plants in the future. Localisation is a key concept


these divisions and the alliances which are forming as a result. The so-called global nuclear enterprise appears to be splitting into two or three major blocs. The spirit of international cooperation, governance and free trade which has characterised the nuclear industry for decades seems to be breaking down. Take for example the passing of a bill in early December that will restrict Russian uranium exports into the USA. The resilience of the global nuclear fuel supply chain has long been considered a strength, but now governments are interfering with it and the repercussions are uncertain at this stage. Meanwhile, China has been forced out of the UK’s new nuclear programme, and a few years back trade tensions between China and USA caused US reactor designer Terrapower to call off its Chinese demonstration project.


These two narratives – the need to triple nuclear


energy to mitigate climate change, and the need to form alliances in face of rising international tensions – are set to dominate the future development of the industry. Absent a major shift in international relations, the nuclear expansion will have to be achieved in a global atmosphere of competition rather than cooperation. In this way, it feels a little like we have travelled back in time to the 1960s. Tripling global nuclear capacity by 2050 is a fantastic


aspirational target and one that should be wholeheartedly supported, but it is important to reflect on what this means. For it means not only more nuclear energy, but the establishment of nuclear facilities in more countries and regions – including those where such developments may raise some eyebrows. Are we truly ready to accept nuclear energy supplying 20-25% of electricity in Africa – like it currently does in the USA and Europe? The West needs to become comfortable with this


prospect, and less judgmental of governments and countries that are increasingly embracing the technology. Do all people have a right to benefit from nuclear technology, or just those lucky enough to be born in rich democracies? Does climate change care about our cultural and religious differences? Nuclear newcomer nations not only want to own their own nuclear power plants, but most want to build up their capability to construct and operate more plants in the future. Localisation is a key concept, as countries seek to employ their domestic industry in supplying parts, components and services. Over time some countries may


even wish to bloom into full reactor vendor nations. This should be embraced by existing nuclear countries as, frankly speaking, we need more of these. Regions, if not individual countries, are likely to want


to achieve full nuclear energy autonomy. Pause to think about this. Considering a nuclear-powered Africa once more, are we willing to accept that in such a future the continent would almost certainly want to host its own enrichment and reprocessing facilities? These emerging nuclear regions are not going to accept foreign nuclear hegemons forever. Some of the existing non-proliferation norms and apparatus – such as insistence on the so-called gold standard – needs to be re-evaluated. If that’s a difficult pill for Western governments to


swallow, then they will perhaps also struggle with the fact that they must now start developing uranium mines on their own soil. Or else they will be competing with strong international uranium demand from regions that host the mines currently, and which may choose to prioritise their own energy needs in a future where high nuclear capacity is the norm. It’s an undeniable fact that tripling the installed nuclear


capacity base means increasing the number of all types of nuclear fuel cycle facilities – except perhaps for one. As the climate imperative for new nuclear grows and more countries form lasting alliances and-or regional partnerships, then the economic and environmental case for shared waste repositories becomes ever more obvious. At the moment the need for each nation to develop its own nuclear waste repositories acts as a handbrake on potential newcomer countries, while countries such as Malaysia and Ireland mention high-level nuclear waste as the reason they will not even consider the technology. The successful establishment of multinational repositories could release that handbrake and allow more nations to move ahead with confidence in establishing nuclear energy programmes. Whether or not geopolitical tensions between Russia,


China and the nuclear pledge countries remain strong in the coming years, we will increasingly see a shift away from a global market for nuclear energy technology and services and towards more national autonomy and regional solutions. There are in effect two kinds of nuclear power – one measured in kilowatt-hours and another in geopolitical clout. We need to aim to triple the first, while equalising the second. ■


David Hess is a policy expert specialising in nuclear energy, he is currently Senior Vice President of Strategy and Sustainability at DeepGEO www.neimagazine.com | January 2024 | 13


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