c Games in 2024, what nt from Euro 2016?
Team Hotel Security
The security provided at each hotel included surveillance of the inner areas and the surrounding area of the hotel with an average fifteen private security agents during the day and ten at night for each hotel. There were systematic bomb sweeps by the police. Access control was provided by private security at entrances to main facilities, parking areas, team floors and function rooms, plus permanent surveillance by police around the hotel. The surveillance team was at base camp even when the team was not there.
Fan zones
There was enhanced security at Fan Zones following interior ministry instructions. This included creating a closed area, body checks and CCTV. This evolved towards the stadia security approach.
Results
Euro 16 was a sporting success. All tickets were sold, with spectators coming from 200
Stadium security
Private security providers were selected one year before the event, after an open selection process with an average of seven companies per match. There were national workshops and local training for these security providers.
On match days, each stadium had a traffic perimeter with temporary traffic restrictions. Additionally, the stadium had a double security perimeter: Outer and Inner. The Outer Security Perimeter was marked with a fence around the venue. There was a chemical and visual check of tickets and electronic check of accreditations, as well as body and bag checks (no metal detectors for public entrances but for specific ones like media or VIP entrances). The Inner Security Perimeter was the existing regular stadium perimeter fence where there was a second check of tickets using electronic turnstiles.
Team protection
Close Protection was provided for each team by SWAT officers. Official Site protection was provided by the organiser’s private security providers and the surrounding area protection by public security (police or gendarmerie). There was a police escort for all team movements, plus one team security liaison officer for every team, specifically trained for the event by the organisers.
© CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – WINT E R 20 17
countries. There was a very high TV audience in the 170 countries where it was broadcast – 8 billion in total. The atmosphere around the tournament was friendly.
The largest-scale security planning for an event in France was a success too, with:
• No terrorist attack • No serious incidents (except one match, England/Russia)
• No intrusions or significant security failure • No dangerous situations for crowds or teams
• No technological damage, despite hundreds of thousands of cyber attacks
• No major problem in flow management, despite later arrivals to venues than foreseen.
The accompanying statistics were 1,555 arrests, 453 convicted, 64 deported, 3,100 denied access.
Lessons learned
Terrorism and cyber crime are the two threats which will weigh in on any major international event in the foreseeable future. Shared intelligence on these, including at the international level, and the relevant risk analysis is the basis of success. Consider the following lessons learned from Euro 2016:
• Quality before quantity – which means starting early with the tendering process, paying a fair price and finding the right
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balance between security resources and the private security market. Training, in particular, provides significant challenges for a one-shot big event.
• A constant focus on coordination – coordinating the security resources and working in partnership with everyone involved requires constant discipline and is needed to avoid security breaches and the ability to react quickly.
• Security as a priority from the beginning – not only for security managers but also for all stakeholders. It requires ownership and prioritisation. The link with transport issues is critical.
• Extensive use of technology for control and communication – with human resources remaining at the heart, it is critical to exploit the latest integrated solutions such as intelligent CCTV, reliable explosive detectors, biometrics, geolocalisation, UAV.
• Keep the security proportionate and reasonable to the event - there is a natural tendency towards escalation. Fan Zones, in particular, should remain flexible.
• Keep control of ticket distribution and their tracking – nominative electronic tickets seem to be the future but have implications for the whole organisation. Shared databases of those banned from stadium and trouble makers is key. The accreditation process should also be in the hands of the Security Department.
• Vehicles should be as controlled as people.
• The security HQ should be compact (ten people in the case of Euro 2016) while the operational teams on the ground should not be undersized. The quality of the logistics should not be neglected, in particular fences and signage.
Conclusion: anticipation and coordination
We must provide a high level of security at major events, with a common strategy agreed between all stakeholders, tight cooperation between organisers and public authorities and a shared and dynamic risk analysis. We must be able to respond quickly to unforeseen situations and provide enhanced qualitative and quantitative security without being obliged to fundamentally change the security model established.
The main lesson is that we can no longer afford a cheap approach to security or consider it as a constraint: it is an asset that everyone should feel responsible for. Good security is not an option, but a requirement which has a cost for both the public and private sector.
Ziad Khoury Head of safety and security Euro 2016
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