What are the implications


Dr Alison Wakefield FSyI Vice Chairman and Chairman Elect Security Institute


and Stephen Massey MSyI Director of Member Services, Security Institute


T


he heightened threat of terrorism is a pan-European problem and there is no


question that our security co-operation with the EU will continue after Brexit. Giving evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee earlier this year, Europol’s British Director, Rob Wainwright, stressed that other EU nations were concerned to make sure “British expertise and leadership is not lost” because “the UK is a very important partner in the security field”.


Wainwright estimated that 40 per cent of all Europol cases have some level of British involvement, and Europol data indicate that in 2015 British authorities initiated 2,500 cases for cross-border investigation and operational support with Europol. Currently only EU member states are entitled to full Europol membership.


States outside the EU have negotiated ‘strategic agreements’ (limited to the exchange of general intelligence as well as strategic and technical information) and ‘operational agreements’ (which have been established with Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, for example) and allow for the exchange of information, including financial and personal data.


The House of Lords European Union Committee stated in their December 2016 report that they found ‘considerable consensus’ among British law enforcement agencies that the following capabilities should be retained or adequately replaced: Europol,


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for security ofBrex


Eurojust, the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), the Prüm Decisions (providing for the automated exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration data) and Passenger Name Records (PNR). This is unsurprising as the UK has been one of the leading contributors to the development of these measures.


Wainwright has argued that any alternative police cooperation arrangement would only be ”partially as good” for the UK since we would become a “second-tier member… still useful but not, for example, having direct access to our database, not being able to lead any of our operational projects, not having the influence in our organisation that they do at the moment”. On the other hand, if the EU recognises that “the UK is a very important partner in the security field”, a mutually acceptable arrangement may be possible if it wishes to avoid reduced access to UK expertise and resources.


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