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s part of its commitment to counter terrorism, the City of London Police supported Paul Carroll in an MSc in this field. He interviewed four leading cyber security
professionals on the appetite of Islamist terrorists to utilise cyber and makes the case for further research and training on collaborative strategies to counter cyber-related terrorism finance.
While there is a significant body of empirical research on traditional terrorist financing, our understanding of the extent of the use of cyber by terrorist financers is underdeveloped. As cyber-related criminality is growing, and terrorists have historically borrowed fundraising techniques from criminals, it is an issue warranting greater attention within terrorism studies.
Learning from the experts
Four subject matter experts were asked to discuss whether Islamist terrorist organisations could utilise cyber, and more specifically cryptocurrencies, to raise and transfer
Getting ahead
finance, now and in the future. The experts were: a lead government cyber security professional; a Detective Inspector and Deputy Director of the Economic Crime Academy, City of London Police; a financial crime compliance director in the banking sector; a researcher at a major policy think tank and former investment banker.
The limitations of cyber for terrorist financing
The four experts were initially, and understandably, dismissive of any significant use of cyber within terrorism finance. It was suggested that traditional methods have greater appeal, and still prove beneficial, regardless of geographic location. This may be for a number of reasons. First, licit and illicit enterprise can have multiple strategic and operational objectives beyond the financial. For example, legitimate companies in high unemployment areas not only raise funds but can also strengthen a group’s political and social capital by providing local jobs. If the company is involved in cross- border trade, then it could be used as a front
to smuggle people or arms. In another example, extortion raises money while signalling a group’s authority over a community and the weakness of the state. Second, the choice of terrorist financial streams is limited by start-up capital, the skills available to the group and geographical location.
The initial investment, digital infrastructures and expertise needed to raise or move money through cyber may not be available, may not represent a worthwhile investment and the creation of a digital footprint may be too risky for risk-adverse terrorist financers, especially when there are well-grounded fundraising tools already in place. For example, why invest money and time in an online scam which can be traced when a donation plate can be passed around at a wedding for no cost and with little risk?
Or why steal money from a bank by hacking when your organisation has existing expertise in tiger kidnapping?
10 © CI TY S ECUR I TY MAGAZ INE – SUMME R 2 0 1 8
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