CABIN CREW


effectively, yet seeks input from other crew members.” She recommends crew briefings as an


effective way to establish clear leadership and authority, while giving cabin crew the opportunity to participate in the discus- sion. “Assertiveness with respect, not insub-


ordination, is the goal for the ‘followers’ in the crew,” Young says. In their paper “Shall We Tell the Pilots?”


published in Te International Journal of Aviation Psychology, Rebecca Chute and Earl Weiner quoted from an aviation safety reporting system report filed by a flight attendant following an incident in the United States: “Aſter being on the ground in Denver


approximately 1/2 hour, passengers and flight attendants began to notice snow and ice mounting on the wings. Te captain was asked three times about de- icing. He claimed it was not necessary. More time passed and more snow and ice became visible on the wings.” Eventually the captain listened to the concerns and commenced de-icing. While this incident shows that certain


personalities can make it hard to forge a working relationship, cabin crew need to be sure of their own abilities and judge- ment and feel confident to raise concerns either with their supervisor or the pilots if they ever have doubts about some- thing. A tragic crash at Kegworth in 1989


occurred when the pilots shut down the wrong engine before their emergency landing. Te No. 1 (leſt) engine had failed, but the pilots mistakenly throttled back and then shut down No. 2. By the time the mistake was discovered, it was too late to restart the operational engine. Te Boeing 737-400 crashed into a field, then onto the M1 motorway. Forty-seven people died and 74 were severely injured. Investigators found that three cabin


attendants and several passengers had observed flames coming from the No. 1 engine but did not inform the flight crew. Te accident report recom- mended the introduction of training exercises for flight and cabin crew to


19 Surface Contamination


improve coordination between them in the event of an emergency. In “Shall We Tell the Pilots?” Chute and


Weiner note that the improvements in aircraſt technology and design that have made flight engineers redundant have contributed to changes in cabin and flight crew interaction. Te flight engineer oſten acted as a filter, deciding whether the infor- mation was important enough to disturb the pilots. “Te flight attendant probably found


it easier to communicate with the flight engineer, whom she might expect to be less judgmental, owing to his relatively lower status in a highly hierarchical cockpit,” they wrote. “Furthermore, his physical proxim- ity to the cockpit door made communica- tion easier. Interrupting his duties was not seen as a problem.” Knowing when it is acceptable to


disturb a pilot is an important judgement call and one that is particularly crucial during the sterile cockpit periods of takeoff and landing. Although all ‘non- essential’ communications between the cabin and cockpit crew are banned, if the cabin crew knows of anything that could affect flight operations, they must inform the pilots. An example of this was an incident


near Orlando, Florida. Te commercial airliner had encountered severe turbu- lence but the rest of the flight and the landing were normal. However, when the aircraſt landed, a flight attendant told the pilots that both cabin attendants and some passengers had been injured in the turbulence. But because the pilots were in a sterile cockpit, the attendants thought they shouldn’t disturb them. Te problem was if any emergency had


developed during approach and landing, the pilots wouldn’t have been aware that the flight attendants might have been too injured to perform their usual emergency functions. In a paper published in CRM Advo-


cate, Tom Chidester and Laura Vaughn of American Airlines had some suggested guidelines for communicating with the sterile cockpit either in person or on the intercom.


Incidents when it was acceptable to


breach the sterile cockpit rule were: • fire in the cabin • exit door ajar • burning odour in the cabin • medical emergency • cart stowage problem • APU torching • fuel spilling from the aircraſt • passengers moving or standing • extreme temperature change • de-ice problem • suspicious, unclaimed bag, package • when aircraſt is moving on the ground, call cockpit if emergency conditions exist such as unusual bangs, scraping sounds, smoke, fire etc. Incidents when it was not acceptable to


breach the sterile cockpit rule included: • non-safety related logbook duties • temperature (i.e. too hot/cold) • entrée preferences • gates information • misconnected baggage • “How much time do we have?” • catering problems • obnoxious but not dangerous passen- gers “Bear in mind that this extract is taken


from an American situation and there may be some cultural differences involv- ing language and interpretation. You will make your own assessment as to suitability and effectiveness,” Sue Rices advises. It’s always worth telling your company


when you have any concerns or observe something that could be a potential problem as training and procedures are developed from people’s reactions to real- life incidents. “Te industry is constantly challenging


and raising its standards to improve proce- dures. Nothing is ever static in the arena of training and education, for operational personnel, inclusive of maintenance engi- neers, ground staff and aircrew.” Cabin crew should use this training


as well as their experience to guide them on whether they should alert other cabin crew or the pilots to a potential problem. As aviation professionals, their knowl- edge is invaluable and a vital cog in the systems safety machine.


MARCH–APRIL 2007 FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA 45


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