Q TROUBLESPOT
Collision course
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In June 2017, a United States Navy destroyer collided with a Philippines-flagged container ship. Seven sailors were killed in the incident and three others, including the commanding officer, were seriously injured
Words: United States Department of the Navy
On the morning of 16 June 2017, USS Fitzgerald departed its home port of Yokosuka, Japan for routine operations. By 01:30 on 17 June, Fitzgerald was roughly 56 nautical miles to the south-west of Yokosuka, near the Izu Peninsula, within sight of land and continuing its transit outbound. The seas were relatively calm at two to four feet. The sky was dark, the moon was relatively bright, and there was scattered cloud cover and unrestricted visibility. At 01:00, Fitzgerald approached three merchant vessels from its starboard forward. These vessels were moving eastbound through the Mikomoto Shima Vessel Traffic Separation Scheme. The closest point of approach of
these vessels and Fitzgerald was minimal, with each presenting a risk of collision. In accordance with the International Rules of the Nautical Road, Fitzgerald was in
what is known as a crossing situation with each of the vessels. In this situation, Fitzgerald was
obligated to take manoeuvring action to remain clear of the other three and, if possible, avoid crossing ahead. In the event Fitzgerald did not exercise this obligation, and the other vessels were required to take early and appropriate action through their own independent manoeuvring. In the minutes before the
collision, the officer of the deck and the junior officer of the deck discussed the relative positioning of the vessels, including the container ship ACX Crystal, and whether or not action needed to be taken to avoid them. Initially, the officer of the deck
intended to take no action, mistaking ACX Crystal to be another of the two vessels with a greater closest point of approach. Eventually, the officer of the deck realized that Fitzgerald was on a
collision course with ACX Crystal, but this recognition was too late. ACX Crystal also took no action
to avoid the collision until it was too late. The officer of the deck exhibited poor seamanship by failing to manoeuvre as required, failing to sound the danger signal and failing to attempt to contact ACX Crystal via radio. In addition, the officer of the deck did not call the commanding officer as appropriate and prescribed by US Navy procedures to allow him to exercise his more senior oversight and judgement of the situation. The remainder of the watch
team on the bridge failed to provide situational awareness and input to the officer of the deck regarding the situation. Additional teams in the Combat Information Centre, an area where tactical information is fused to provide situational awareness, failed to provide the officer of the deck with input and information.
Collision impact The port side of ACX Crystal’s bow, near the top where the anchor hangs, struck Fitzgerald’s starboard side above the waterline. ACX Crystal ’s bulbous bow, under the water, struck Fitzgerald on the starboard side just forward of the middle part of the ship. ACX Crystal ’s bulbous bow also struck the starboard access trunk, an entry space that opens into Berthing 2 through a non-watertight door. Berthing 2 is a crew area containing 42 racks which spans from one side of the vessel across to the other side two decks below the main deck of the ship. Seconds after impact, sailors
in Berthing 2 started yelling “Water on deck!” and “Get out!” One sailor saw another knocked out of his rack by water. Others began waking up shipmates who had slept through the initial impact. At least one sailor had to
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