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SAFETY SITREP Safety-Related Information and Resources from the Vertical Aviation Safety Team WARRANTED RISK


Government, military, and public safety aviation exist because


society occasionally


needs professionals to do what others are unable or unwilling to do, all while accepting elevated levels of known risk.


We understand why public


safety operators accept high- risk missions. The questions that remain are:


• How do these operators manage elevated risk?


• What factors come into play when making go/no- go decisions?


Traditional risk management systems focus on two variables: probability (likelihood) and severity


commercial


(consequence). operators,


LOOKING BEYOND PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY IN PUBLIC SAFETY AVIATION •


driven by noble intentions or heightened emotions. The resulting target fixation or mission mentality all too often leads to preventable tragedy.


Most agencies have formal methods


for assessing


Few have formal methods for evaluating gain. Instead, gain frequently enters the equation informally


through risk. Unwarranted risk


Currier asserts, “If bad things happen while you are conducting a proper mission in a professional manner, leadership


at all stand behind you.” a frantic


call, driving rushed or poor decisions. Examples may include:


• •





For that


keeps things simple. If the risk is too high, the flight crew must reduce the risk to an acceptable level or avoid it altogether.


Nothing for


readers


groundbreaking who


consider


themselves proficient pilots and flight planners. However, for those who conduct government, military, or public safety operations, does mission type factor into your risk-based policy and pre-flight decisions?


If not, perhaps it should.


What is often absent from the formal risk assessment process is a third variable: Gain.


Public safety organizations would do well to incorporate gain into doctrine, policy, and mission planning because pilots are likely already considering it on the fly, literally. Without structured guidance, this creates


the 18 conditions May/June 2026 for poor dynamic decision-making “There’s a child involved.”


“The suspect is considered armed.”


“The fire is threatening critical infrastructure.”


• “Someone may still be alive.”


Responding to these calls is routine,


but what process used to justify launch?


One of the Coast Guard’s most celebrated and decorated aviators, Vice Admiral John Currier, challenged his service’s flight crews to consider whether the risk they accept is warranted when weighed against the potential gain. Currier asserted that Coast Guard crews must always


consider the gain:


mission value, public benefit, lives saved, property protected, or threats mitigated.


His article, “Risk Management for the Proficient Operator,” published in the 2013 issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings, recognized that not all risks are equal because not all missions are


equal. He argued that


professional operators must differentiate between:


• Manageable risk • Warranted risk is


Is gain influencing your crews’ decisions? Almost certainly. The question is whether your organization acknowledges it.


When flight crews respond to a missing child, an active shooter, a stranded hiker,


or


a mariner in distress, are they only evaluating probability and severity? Or are they also considering the potential gain of a successful mission?


If gain is already part of the decision-making


process,


is it addressed in policy, training, and doctrine? Is it


understood consistently


across the organization? Or does each crew develop its own interpretation based on experience, culture, and circumstance?


Two crews facing identical circumstances may reach different conclusions regarding


That philosophy now resides on page one of the Coast Guard’s Air Operations Manual, which states:


“In the operational environment, mission demands may require on-scene deviation from prescribed instructions or policy when, in the judgment of the pilot-in-command, such deviation is necessary for flight safety or the saving of human life.”


The Missing Variable levels will


mission acceptance. One may launch. The other may decline. Neither decision is necessarily wrong.


The concern is whether both crews are applying the same organizational framework, or whether they are making ad hoc or subjective risk-versus- gain calculations without clear guidance.


Admiral Currier’s concept of warranted risk recognized that some missions carry extraordinary


value, but


that value does not grant unlimited permission to accept extraordinary risk.


If your crews are already making risk-versus-gain calculations in the cockpit, perhaps it is time to ensure that your organization’s policies, training programs, and leadership expectations provide a common framework for


correctly is the making those


decisions. “Discussing these parameters at 0 AGL and 0 knots


successful missions


cornerstone for


your


crews. “They need to know what your organization will, and will not, accept,” said Mark Bruno, the Coast Guard’s current chief of safety and environmental health and a former MH-65D pilot.


Disclaimer: Each organization must establish a unique risk management policy based on its underlying doctrine, legal authorities, operational environment, and mission requirements.


of


By Chris Hill, senior director–safety, Vertical Aviation International


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