MY 2 CENTS By Randy Rowles FAA OVERSIGHT ‘DYSFUNCTIONALITY’ PERFECTED!
Many facets of our lives, both personal and professional, changed during the COVID-19 pandemic. One significant entity within the aviation industry, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), took great strides in protecting its staff by providing a path for most FAA employees to work from home. During the pandemic, connecting with an FAA staff member, once the communication process was developed and released, seemed to be simple and functional. As an operator, we were pleasantly surprised by the expeditious email and phone call returns that were occurring in this new FAA work- from-home world...but it was all about to change.
A few documents from our FAA principal operations inspector (POI) were past the promised timeframe, so I picked up the phone and called for an update. We connected and were informed that the front-line-manager (FLM) directed a delay on any further FAA tasking for certain operators. The FLM’s reasoning was that not all operators were able to obtain service by the Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) staff, so any effort to assist my certificate would look to be preferential treatment.
What was a good situation (having an FAA inspector with limited distractions servicing operators’ needs) became a political knee-jerk reaction that all but halted progress.
This story is not unique to our operation. FAA oversight for operators reflects almost intentional “dysfunctionality,” as I like to call it. FAA processes between FSDO locations have limited standardization or cohesion; in many cases, you wouldn’t
10 July/Aug 2023
know they’re all working for the same agency.
It is important to note that FAA staff are victims to FAA policy and procedures as well. FAA inspectors who attempt to work outside constricting FAA methods may find themselves the target of Inspector General (IG) investigations for just doing their job.
As an operator, we are wholly dependent upon the FAA fulfilling its obligations of oversight-supporting functions that lead to authorizations for us to simply do our jobs. The relationship between FAA and operator is often unique to the FSDO, assigned FAA inspector, or overall relationship between the two. But is this method of oversight correct? In all fairness, my experience dealing with the FAA is mostly limited to the helicopter industry although most processes should be agnostic in this regard.
The pressure points within FAA oversight have followed industry over the past few years. As stated, the pandemic was the catalyst for many changes. However, a change in workforce culture supported by union engagement with FAA management continues to drive dysfunctional processes. With dysfunctionality comes frustration on both sides of the issue. The FAA, at least within the helicopter- specific inspector cadre, is experiencing an increased strain on obtaining and maintaining an experienced and qualified workforce.
Many other contributing factors drive this situation, such as airline opportunities, but the inspectors themselves often tell a grim story of frustration within their ranks
that leads them to explore other career paths.
Our operation is located within the North Texas FSDO service area with offices in Irvine, Texas. The location of the FSDO works well in my opinion. The challenge to operators is simply gaining access to the FSDO and limited employees working out of the facility on any given day. A non-public survey of FAA office space conducted post-pandemic showed many locations with only 20%-30% of FAA employees working at the FSDO office location. Although these numbers are improving, remote staffing continues to occur.
Obtaining qualified and accessible FAA inspectors to conduct required observations and proficiency checks is nearing critical mass. The FAA instituted the Flight Safety Inspector Resource Program (FSIRP) several years ago to provide FSDO management a path to access qualified inspector resources from other FSDO locations on an as-needed basis. This effort in its infancy was functional, but short-lived. A major failure point was the requirement that FSIRP “volunteer” inspectors were fulfilling these duties in addition to their existing workload. In many cases, the managers for the FSIRP inspectors would not allow them to conduct FSIRP activities simply because they were also understaffed. The FSIRP program remains in effect, but the limited resources within the FAA inspector helicopter-specific staff are at a critical low.
Constant changes to FAA principal inspectors, long wait times for operator requests to be fulfilled, and new FAA
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84
