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Policy & Compliance


Honam fire report highlights role of dangerous chemicals


Singapore’s Safety Investigation Bureau report into the Maersk Honam fire has focused on the handling of dangerous chemicals and booking processes


Periodically there is an incident involving dangerous goods which BIFA highlights to its Members with the intention of reminding them of the disastrous and sometimes tragic consequences of when something goes wrong. The Maersk Honam was en route from


Singapore to Suez when a fire broke out on the 15,262 teu vessel in March 2018 resulting in the death of five crewmembers. The Singapore- flagged vessel was loaded with 7,860 containers when the fire started. In October 2020 Singapore’s Safety Investigation Bureau published its report. Due to the extensive damage, findings into the


cause of the fire were inconclusive. It was “possible” that the stowage of 54 containers containing a chemical used in bleaches and cleaning products was the source. “It is possible that one or more containers in number three cargo hold (containing sodium dichlorocyanurate dehydrate (SDID)) were compromised by the self- decomposition of the SDID.”


Chemical decomposition Decomposition of the dangerous cargo generated intense heat, allowing the fire to develop rapidly and out of control. The problem was further compounded by the block stowage of the SDID, which exacerbated the rate of reaction and heat production. The exothermic decomposition occurred at a


much lower value than typically declared by the shipper, and the presence of water and stowage of SDID in large consignments further reduced the inset temperature. The report notes: “Serious consideration must be given to the prospect that the decomposition could be initiated as a direct result of the inherent properties of the cargo itself.”


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The IMDG Code allows for the classification


and carriage of sodium dichlorocyanurate dehydrate under Class 9, which fails to address the inherent thermal instability of the product. The report notes that the chemical in question was stored under-deck, where the fixed fire- fighting means was CO2


, which is ineffective in


dealing with fires caused by such chemicals. There were also internal issues such as a delay


in raising the alarm and a lack of clear allocation of roles in such an emergency. The report also highlights the industry-wide


issues that exist in the booking process for dangerous goods. It emphasised that there is no evidence of mis-declared cargo in this instance, but that the cargo screening process in the industry is not able to ensure that declarations by the shipper match the description and properties of the cargo in the container. It is physically impossible to carry out such checks manually. Maersk has changed stowage procedures,


moving dangerous goods containers away from accommodation and engine areas, and reviewed emergency response procedures.


Responsibilities From what we hear, too often traders do not fulfil their responsibilities correctly, ex-works consignments being a particular case when the seller says that they are not the shipper and will not even provide a dangerous goods note, etc. When we are dealing with dangerous


chemicals with the potential to kill, that is not acceptable. There also has to be an increased emphasis on training and an increased willingness to ask questions about the cargo being moved. It is imperative that, from beginning to end,


everyone fully plays their role in moving dangerous goods in a sustained effort to minimise the possibility of such incidents occurring in the future.


December 2020


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