Case # Case Name 75-2541-00 Angela Baylor v.
D.H. Services, Inc.
Counsel for Appellant Area of Law
Benjamin Boscolo 301-220-0050
Negligence/Civil Procedure (Rule 2-507)
76-2542-00 Allen Henville v. Southwest Airlines, Inc.
Cynthia Young 410-269-7699
Workers Comp – Going and Coming Rule
77-2594-00 Virginia Cherry v. Mayor Steven Kleeman and City Council of Baltimore
410-752-1220
Sovereign (Governmental) Immunity
78-2606-00 Sue Ann Absolon v. Martin Freeman Paul Justin Dollahite, et al. 301-315-0200
Contributory Negligence/ Summary Judgment
Beard/Montgomery County
Bolinger/Baltimore County
North/Anne Arundel County
Judge Jurisdiction
Lamasney/Prince George’s County
Issues
Did the trial court err in applying Rule 2-507 to plaintiff’s complaint and dismissing the lawsuit after the statute of limitations had run where timely service on the defendant did not occur in part because the corporate defendant (the maintenance company at Landover Mall) changed its name, its corporate identity and registered agent, thus preventing prompt service of process?
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for the employer/insurer ruling that an airline employee who is injured while entering an employee parking lot on air- port property is deemed to not have sustained a compensable injury under the Workers Compensation Act?
Plaintiff sustained personal injury at the Waxter Center for Senior Citizens in Baltimore City when an object suspended from the ceiling fell and struck her on the head and neck. Was the operation of the Center by Baltimore City a pro- prietary function and did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiff ’s complaint based on the doctrine of governmen-
tal immunity?
Did the trial court err in ruling that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law when she was injured while crossing Rockville Pike initially on a “walk” sign that subsequently began to flash “don’t walk” when she reached the median. MUTCD regulation 4d-2 states in part: “the ‘don’t walk’ indication, while flashing, means that a pedestrian shall not START to cross the roadway in the direction of the indication, but that any pedestrian who has partly completed his crossing during this steady walk indication shall proceed to a sidewalk or to a safety island.”
79-2646-00 Jeff Messing v. Bank of America, N.A.
80-2654-00 Lawrence Mize v. Jesse Hoskins, et al.
81-2658-00 State Farm
Insurance Companies v. Carol Weishaar
eff Messing
410-576-8338 Commercial Transactions/ Civil Procedure
Michael Marshall
410-685-2022 Employment Law/ Civil Procedure
Walter Gillcrist, Jr. 301-654-0896
Insurance/Procedure
82-2827-00 Council of Unit Owners Barry Steelman of South River Condos v. 410-321-4740
Heritage Harbour, LLC, et al. Compulsory Arbitration/ Waiver
83-2836-00 Western MD Health John Robb, Jr. Systems v. Dolores Michaels, 301-722-5511
P.R. of Estate of John Imes Estates and Trusts/ Civil Procedure
84-2868-00 Brenda Neal v. Erie Insurance Group
Mark Herman 410-837-2144
Motor Vehicle/Phantom Vehicle/Objects
McCurdy/Baltimore City
Leasure/Allegany County
Silkworth/Anne Arundel County
Galloway/Carroll County
Noel/Baltimore City Noel/Baltimore City
Did the trial court err in construing the commercial law article requirement of “reasonable identification” to include a thumbprint if demanded by a drawee to whom a check is presented for payment, even though other reasonable and customary documentary forms of identification were prof- fered?
Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff’s motion for production of documents seeking a police officer’s test scores and other documents related to the police department’s lieu- tenants’ examination to establish a meaningful challenge to the examination’s validity?
Did the trial court err in dismissing State Farm’s complaint for declaratory judgment on the issue of coverage for the defendant below because of Maryland’s “potentiality rule” as articulated in the Brohawn decision (276 Md. 396), and in ruling that prosecution of the declaratory judgment ac- tion would interfere with the defense of the underlying tort case?
Did the trial court err in ruling that the defendant’s partici- pation in litigation for 15 months did not constitute waiver of the arbitration provision in its sales agreement, which applied to only one of the defendants, and in belatedly or- dering arbitration of the dispute?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering judg- ment in favor of the personal representative when the hospital’s attorney appeared 11 minutes late for the hear- ing and in not granting the hospital’s motion to alter or amend the judgment when it learned that the hospital’s employee had been present in the waiting room with the necessary records but did not know that the case had been called before the court?
Did the trial court err in directing a verdict for the defen- dant insurer holding that the object in the roadway, which caused plaintiff to swerve and strike the guardrail, did not give rise to a UM claim against a phantom vehicle because res ipsa locquitor did not apply and plaintiff failed to prove that the object came from a phantom vehicle?
22
Trial Reporter
Fall 2001
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