Workers’ Compensation
Accidental injury not in course of em- ployment - injuries for which compensation may be had particular causes, circumstances, and conditions of injury – slipping, tripping, or falls
Facts: Appellant was attending a semi- nar in Canada on behalf of the Appellee, University Research Corporation.
She
stepped in a bathtub at the hotel in which she was staying, and slipped and sustained injuries. The Workers’ Compensation Com- mission found the Claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of the course of her employment. That decision was appealed to the Circuit Court for Mont- gomery County by the Appellees, and both parties moved for a summary judg- ment. After argument, the Circuit Court granted the motion by the Appellees for Summary Judgment and denied the Appellant’s motion for Summary Judg- ment.
Held: Affirmed. Injures that claimant sustained when she slipped in the bath- tub of the hotel room as she was showering in order to get ready for business meeting were not compensable under workers’ compensation law. There were no unusual or extraordinary conditions of claimant’s employment that caused her to bathe or to expose herself to the hazards of bath- ing differently than most people concerned about their appearance and hygiene.
Patricia Mulready v. University Research Corporation, et. al., No. 6119, Sept. Term, 1998, filed October 1, 1999. Opinion by Eyler J.
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Exclusivity Provision Act – exclusivity provision of Workers’ Compensation Act not a bar to suit where appellant hospi- tal was acting in capacity of care giver and not employer at time of accident – adoption of dual capacity doctrine – evi- dence of prior payments made by hospital to injured employee inadmis- sible at medical malpractice trial under Collateral Source Rule and because § 3- 2a-08 Cts. & Jud. Proc., statutory provision cited by appellanit, inappli- cable.
Suburban Hospital, Inc., et al. v. Phyllis R. Kirson, No. 1629, Sept. Term, 1998. Opin- ion by Moylan, J., Filed October 27, 1999.
Spring 2000
Trial
Pleading – to demand strict proof of an issue in Maryland Rule 3-308, a district court defendant must describe with specificity which issues they request proof of at trial.
Reopening – the trial court abused its discretion by not reopening the case to allow the plaintiff to prove ownership.
Facts: While attempting to make a left- hand turn, Sophia Cooper was struck by a car driven by Robert Sacco and owned by Gregory Vlachos.
Asserting that the
collision injured her, Cooper filed suit for damages in the District Court of Mary- land. In her complaint, Cooper specifically alleged that the vehicle was driven by Sacco and owned by Vlachos. Sacco and Vlachos filed a Notes of Inten- tion to Defend, which stated that they demanded “strict proof” of the claim. No demand was made specifically for Coo- per to prove ownership of the vehicle. At trial, Cooper’s case-in-chief con- sisted solely of her testimony, during which she never specifically identified ei- ther defendant as a negligent party. Sacco and Vlachos moved for judgment upon conclusion of Cooper’s case, arguing that she had not proved who caused the acci- dent or owned the vehicle. Cooper moved to reopen the case in order to read part of Sacco’s and Vlachos’s answers to interroga- tories into the record in which they allegedly admitted those issues. The trial judge refused and entered judgment for the defendants. Cooper appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which affirmed.
Held: Reversed and remanded. Mary- land Rule 3-308 requires defendants to make a “specific demand” that certain is- sues be proven by the plaintiff, including
the ownership of a motor vehicle, or they are admitted. The Court of Appeals held that a broad demand for “strict proof,” such as the one filed by Sacco and Vlachos, does not satisfy Rule 3-308. To demand that a plaintiff prove any of the issues listed in Rule 3-308, defendants must state spe- cifically which issues they wish the plaintiff to prove at trial. Turning to the denial of the motion
to reopen, the Court noted that the trial court’s decision on whether to reopen a trial generally should not be reversed ab- sent an abuse of discretion. The Court recognized a distinction, however, be- tween cases in which the moving party has inadvertently omitted material evi- dence and those in which the party wishes to submit supplemental evidence. The Court noted several cases holding that it is an abuse of discretion not to reopen a trial when the evidence sought to be ad- mitted is material to the moving party’s case. By contrast, most of the cases af- firming the denial of a motion to reopen have dealt with efforts to submit needless evidence, or evidence already submitted through other means. In these situations, the discretion of the trial judge as to whether to reopen the case is broader. When a party is not allowed to submit evidence that is essential to their case, however, it generally would be prejudi- cial under Rule 3-308 for the trial judge not to allow that party to submit such evidence, especially when it is readily avail- able. The Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by not reopening the case to allow Cooper to prove facts mate- rial to her case, particularly when the evidence was omitted inadvertently, was readily available, and when the defendants never put her on notice that they de- manded proof of ownership.
Sophia Cooper v. Robert Sacco et al., No. 72, September Term, 1999, filed Febru- ary 11, 2000. Opinion by Cathell, J.
MTLA 2000 PRESIDENTS’ DINNER AND INSTALLATION OF OFFICERS In Honor and Appreciation of
William T. Wood, President 1999-2000 Philip O. Foard, President 2000-2001
GUEST SPEAKER- Kath leen Ken n ed y Town sen d Friday, June 2, 2000
The Center Club- 100 Light Street, Baltimore Trial Reporter Cocktails 6:00 p.m. Dinner 7:00 p.m. 37
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