Appellate Decisions (Continued from page 31)


garding the MMPI test results admissible in evidence for another valid purpose, the evidence, as presented in this case, should have been excluded and the trial judge should have granted Appellant’s motion to strike.


Christine Ann Bentley v. Alan Carroll, M.D., et. al., No. 116, September Term, 1998, decided August 4, 1999. Opinion by Raker, J.


Tort


Automobiles – “Boulevard Law” applied when unfavored driver “inched” across intersection with favored road even if parked vehicles there obstructed his view on one side.


Defendant’s effort to “inch” across the intersection did not satisfy his legal obli- gation to yield under the “Boulevard Law.”


Brenda Brendel v. Ronald Ellis, No. 6751, September Term, 1998, filed December 6, 1999. Opinion by Thieme, J.


Automobile driver was killed. Contributory Negligence – violation of parking regulations as evidence of con- tributory negligence:


When a trial court instructs a jury con- cerning a violation of a statute, a jury finds a party negligent because they violated the statute, and the appellate court opines that the statute is inapplicable, then the trial court committed prejudicial error. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the presumption of due care by decedent. Although the presumption of due care in favor of the decedent is an evidentiary presumption


and must be effectuated by the granting of a jury instruction, whether the pre- sumption applies in a given case is within the discretion of the trial judge and turns upon the nature of the evidence that has been put before the jury. When the decedent’s conduct at the time of the ac- cident is in dispute and his actions cannot be established by evidence other than his own obviously unavailable testimony, the presumption of due care fills the eviden- tiary void created by his absence. The eyewitness testimony of her friend, who observed the accident first hand but sur- vived to tell about it, and that of her boyfriend compensated, for the absence of Rebecca Wozniak’s testimony. Indeed, the testimony of those witnesses, filled the evidentiary gap created by Ms. Wozniak’s death from her vantage point. Accord- ingly, the court did not abuse its discretion denying appellants’ requested jury instruc- tion.


McQuay v. Schertle, No. 582, September Term, 1998, filed June 2, 1999. Opinion by Byrnes, J.


________


Boulevard Rule – opinion testimony by experts – doctrine of last clear chance.


Facts: Constance Burdette was killed on May 1, 1996, in an accident involving her automobile and a truck owned by Rockville Crane Rental, Inc., and driven by John Johnson. A wrongful death and survival action was brought against the corporation and Mr. Johnson by Mrs. Burdette’s husband, Gary Burdette, and by their daughter, Leslie Burdette. A jury found that (1) Johnson had been negligent and (2) Mrs. Burdette had been contributorily negligent. On appeal, Gary and Leslie Burdette argued that the trial court erred by:


clear chance. Held: Affirmed


The trial court did not err by refusing to permit appellants’ accident reconstruc- tion experts to opine about the “cause” of the accident.


The experts testified that


Johnson was driving approximately 64 MPH in a 40 MPH zone when he first saw Mrs. Burdette’s vehicle. They testi- fied about the speed and behavior of the vehicles and about the mistakes the driv- ers may have made. Questions about the “cause” of the accident called for legal conclusions and were properly disallowed. The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury about the doctrine of last clear chance. After Mrs. Burdette’s vehicle began to move into his path, Johnson had approximately three and a half seconds to recognize the peril and react to avoid it. This brief period did not constitute a new “clear” opportunity for him to avoid the accident. The doc- trine of last clear chance was inapplicable.


Burdette v. Rockville Crane Rental, Inc., No. 249, September Term 1999, filed Febru- ary 4, 2000. Opinion by Kenney, J.


________


Damages – Collateral Source Rule – medical expenses – recovery of medical expenses as damages under the Collat- eral Source Rule is precluded where those medical expenses have been gratuitously provided by the federal government and the federal government settles its claim for those medical expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651 – 2653 (the Medical Care Recovery Act).


(2)


refusing to permit appellants’ accident reconstruction experts to opine as to the “cause” of the accident; (4) refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of last


Facts: On 30 April 1993, Frederick Piquette (Piquette), a Naval Academy Midshipman First Class, was riding his bicycle in preparation for an upcoming triathlon competition. At the intersec- tion of Chesterfield and Crownsville Roads in Anne Arundel County, Mary- land, Piquette failed to come to a complete stop at the stop sign facing him on Chesterfield Road. He rolled through the stop sign and proceeded to make a right turn onto Crownsville Road. At the same time, Seth Herman Stevens (Stevens), attempted to make a left turn off of Crownsville Road onto Chesterfield Road.


A collision occurred between


Piquette and Stevens. Piquette was se- verely injured in the resulting collision. Piquette was flown by helicopter to the


Maryland Shock Trauma Center for treat- ment. As a result of his injuries, Piquette incurred medical expenses exceeding Sev- enty Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000). Because Piquette was midshipman at the


34 Trial Reporter Spring 2000


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