PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE
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relieved to hear that the government had changed its view during the course of our inquiry and now no longer intends to take such a step.
Penal powers Among other issues raised in the Green Paper were the powers of both Houses to punish “contempts.” A contempt is an action which interferes with the ability of either House to carry out their respective function: one example might be a witness who lies when giving evidence to a Select Committee. In 2011 a Select Committee
inquiry into allegations of phone hacking by members of the media led to accusations that certain individuals had misled the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select
Committee. This resulted in a debate about the extent and enforceability of select committee powers. The Clerk of the House of
Commons told a committee in 2012 that “recent events have shown to a wider audience what all insiders always knew; that there were considerable doubts about whether the House would really impose its will on those whom a committee wished to summon, or punish those who gave unsworn false or misleading evidence to a committee”. Parliament faces several
difficulties when considering how to punish contempts: it has been well over a century since either House last used its penal powers (for instance, to fine or imprison those guilty of contempt); the procedure for using
48 | The Parliamentarian | 2014: Issue One
those powers is far from clear; and, while domestic courts may be unable to review or challenge proceedings in Parliament, the European Court of Human Rights does claim jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides for the right to a fair trial. The government told the
committee that it did not believe current procedures provided appropriate safeguards for the successful prosecution of an individual for contempt, and stated that “in order for the defendant in any such proceedings to be given a fair trial, the House would have to significantly change its current procedures and practices”. The committee first considered
whether it was necessary for select committees to have the powers to summon witnesses, to compel the provision of certain papers and to punish individuals who refuse to co-operate. We unanimously agreed that such powers, while undoubtedly only rarely employed, must be kept in reserve if select committees are to function effectively. Once we accepted that both
Houses should indeed have credible penal powers, we asked how this might best be done. It became apparent there were two options. First, Parliament could pass legislation putting its penal powers, and an appropriate enforcement mechanism, on a statutory basis. Second, Parliament could assert its existing powers and set out how
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