THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
• A pure constituency-based first- past-the-post system; • A hybrid system with one compo- nent the election of representatives from constituencies on a first-past- the-post basis and a second compo- nent the election of representatives from party lists on a proportional basis (each component having a separate ballot and being treated as separate elements), and • A system similar to the second except that the outcome of the list portion is used to restore proportion- ality rather than being an element in its own right (broadly the system that applies to our municipal elections).
It must be pointed out that the
first two alternatives do not meet the constitutional requirement of a generally proportional outcome to elections and would therefore require an amendment to the constitution. That apart, the distortions in fair representation mentioned earlier which are inherent in a single- Member constituency system would be a problem. To illustrate the extent of such distortions it can be noted that the party with the largest support in the 2011 municipal elections won 78 per cent of the wards contested on a first-past-the-post simple majority basis but received only 61 per cent of the total votes cast for ward candidates. That is also largely likely to be the outcome if Parliament is constituted purely on a constituency system (the first alternative above). With the second alternative, where
the two elements of constituencies and a list proportional element are treated as separate components, the same basic distortions will occur albeit on a lesser scale – 61 per cent of the votes will gain just short of 70 per cent of the seats. In addition to the under- and over-representation of the preferences of the electorate in these systems, there is an elephant in the room: the further distortions which may stem from demarcation decisions – a potential factor in any constituency system. The third alternative would make
it possible to restore proportionality in general, as long as single-Member
constituency representatives amount to no more than half the total number of representatives. Allocations from the proportional list component would be used to smooth the under- and over-representation inherent in the constituency element of the combined system. There is, however, a problem
with this system relating to strategic voting as a way to hold individual representatives accountable for their actions (or lack thereof). For example, a voter who is a strong supporter of Party A decides to hold the constituency candidate of Party A accountable for some reason or other and therefore decides to vote for the Party B candidate. To accentuate the point, let us say that the voter starts a campaign and persuades 10,000 other voters to do the same and in the result all cast their constituency votes for the Party B candidate – but their loyal party proportional votes for Party A. The effect of this strategic voting may well be that the constituency candidate of Party A is not elected and the objective of accountability is achieved. Now for the problem: The votes
cast for Party A in the constituency element are added to the proportional votes cast for that party in order to arrive at the level of its total support (if that were not done then we would in effect be dealing with the second alternative above). The same is done in regard to Party B. Because the 10,000 voters shared their two separate votes equally between the two parties, their separate votes in effect become opposing votes and cancel each other out. When there are more than two constituency candidates the potential for unintended consequences becomes even bigger and the combination of accountability and strategic voting, whilst it is a prerogative of the voter, is not without complications.
No case for change The problems identified in each possible alternative do not, in themselves, justify the retention of our present system. Solving a (perceived) problem in our current system without
considering the implications of those alternatives may, however, create different problems. It is perhaps also relevant to look at the 1,162 municipal ward by-elections held since 2000, all conducted on the basis of a single- Member, first-past- the-post system. Changes in terms of party affiliation came about in only 15 per cent of these by-elections, some of which occurred more than once in the same ward. These changes favoured the various majority and opposition parties in these municipalities in broadly equal measure. There is thus no strong evidence over this 12-year period that most voters saw accountability as a salient consideration even when they had a system at their disposal to express that inclination. The link between an electoral
system and accountability is in any event probably debatable. At the municipal level, issues such as potholes, refuse removal and the like can be geographically identified and therefore more easily linked to an individual ward councillor. That approach is more tenuous when it comes to such matters as foreign policy, economic growth and unemployment which are vested in the national sphere of government. Given the absence of a clear
nexus and the difficulties regarding fair representation which are inherent in single-Member constituency representation, calls for change would not seem necessarily to be aimed at the best electoral system but possibly have political underpinnings. Even if this assumption is
incorrect and accountability were to be improved by introducing a constituency element into our electoral system, the resulting (potential) distortions in fair representation might prove too heavy a price to pay – not least because
many voters might not realize the implications of splitting their votes between constituency and party candidates. The final test for any democracy
and electoral system is the ability of the electorate to express its will freely and to bring about any desired change in a Legislature (or government) without the will of the people being distorted to any significant extent by the workings of an electoral system. In our case the majority party has changed in two provincial Legislatures and in a much larger number of municipalities since 1994. Winners were happy and those who lost out were not: but the important point is that nobody attributed the changes – whether victory or defeat – to our electoral system. In all these cases our present
system promoted an acceptance of the outcome as an accurate reflection of the preferences of voters on the day of the elections and transitions were generally smooth and peaceful. This, together with the inclusiveness, simplicity and transparency of our current system, makes fundamental changes at the current stage of our growing democracy undesirable. Moreover, our electoral stability
has served us well, not only domestically but also internationally, as is witnessed by our standing as a country with an established electoral democracy.
The Parliamentarian | 2013: Issue One - South Africa | 71
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