Feature 1 | AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND Coles’ report will be important because
of the implications for the A$36-40 billion Collins replacement programme revealed in the 2009 Defence White Paper. Tis called for 8-12 boats. Tere was much speculation earlier this
year that the programme would be cancelled but on 23 May Defence Materiel Minister Jason Clare confirmed that Project Sea 1000 would continue, despite cuts in the Federal budget, partly because of the implications for jobs in South Australia. However, there are fears that the problems
New Zealand’s HMNZS Canterbury has encountered serious problems since being introduced into service.
fully operational and did not respond to the other claims. On 23 August HMAS Farncomb had
to surface hastily to investigate a fault on the control system for the electric motor. The submarine retained the capacity to manoeuvre using its emergency propulsion unit and the problem was solved. There were no similar problems with the Oberon class predecessors to the Collins and some experts claim the fundamental problem is that no individual has overall responsibility for keeping the submarine fleet operational. In May 2010 ASC re-organised their submarine organisation to deliver a sustainable Collins class fleet within tightly prescribed financial parameters. This is claimed to have delivered significant cost
savings to the Royal Australian Navy and made the work place more efficient.
Collins review Despite the Defence Department’s public optimism on 20 July, Defence Minister Stephen Smith announced a significant challenge – establishing what exactly is wrong with the Australian Collins class submarines. A British expert, Mr John Coles from BMT Defence Services, was selected to head another review into the fleet to discover why there is usually only one boat available for operations. Mr Coles was the Chief Executive of the UK’s Warship Support Agency between 1997 and 2005. His interim report is expected by December with a final version following by April 2012.
with the Collins class will delay a decision on replacing them for up to two years, indeed Mr Smith said no firm decisions would be made until the report was received. Feasibility studies began in December
2007 and the First Pass (initial approval) was expected this year with Second Pass (construction phase) anticipated about 2015. If, however, the problems with the Collins are not overcome, the present government will certainly not authorise the programme, even if the Royal Australian Navy could provide sufficient manpower. Some experts fear the design will not be completed until 2019 with the first boat not operational until 2030, five years late. Meanwhile, the Collins class submarines
continue to be upgraded. Kollmorgen has been awarded a contract for Mk 20 Mod 0 electro-optical sensor system units for the submarines under the foreign military sales programme; sonar, communications and electronic warfare upgrades are also planned. Perhaps it is of some consolation to
Australia’s submariners that the Royal Australian Navy successfully demonstrated its submarine rescue capability as part of as part of Exercise ‘Black Carillon 2011-1’ at the beginning of June. Te system is based upon the James Fisher Submarine Rescue Service LR5 submersible, formally used by NATO, which was leased by Canberra in 2009 following concerns over the nationally- developed Remora diving bell system, which led DNV to refuse it certification. The bulk of Australia’s combat force
Te Mana, one of the Royal New Zealand Navy’s two ANZAC class frigates. 18
consists of MEKO 200 (ANZAC) and Oliver Hazard Perry (Adelaide) class frigates, both of which have also been upgraded. Four Adelaides have their anti-air warfare capabilities enhanced with the ADACS combat management system and upgraded Mk 92 weapon control system and can
Warship Technology October 2011
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