Box 6: Transnational Organized Crime in Illegal Logging: A Challenge to REDD
As opposed to a few decades ago, there now exist a range of international conventions and agreements on certification, law enforcement and collaboration for the protection of rainforests, including FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade) and declarations from the European Union (EU), the UN, and the G8, among others. But, while these agreements have provided an important step and necessary legal background for further action, their effects have also been constrained and limited by the scale, extent and transnational organized nature of ille- gal logging, which is not on the decline overall (Nelleman et al. 2007; INTERPOL-World Bank 2009; Nelleman et al. 2010). Cur- rently, the extent of illegal logging in major parts of south-east Asia, South America and Central Africa is in the general range of 50-90%, with countries such as Indonesia, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru and Bolivia in excess of 70% (FAO, 2007a; INTERPOL-World Bank 2009; Nel- leman et al. 2007, 2010). Indeed, while some reports indicate major declines in direct illegal logging in Indonesia and several other places based on mainly mid 2000’s data, they also point to contradictions in expert surveys suggesting increased corrup- tion (Lawson and MacFaul, 2010), and this may reflect more the change in the nature of illegal practices than a decline in and of itself (INTERPOL-World Bank 2009; Nelleman et al. 2007, 2010).
The value of illegal logging at the production level before mar- keting is estimated at USD 11 billion or comparable to that of USD 13 billion in the global drug trade (with a street value of drugs estimated at USD 322 billion). The loss of carbon se-
questration services alone is estimated at USD 3,711-11,185 / ha for a 25-year period. With estimates for illegal logging at 20- 50%, and the global deforestation at approximately 13 million ha annually, this gives an annual loss in carbon values of bil- lions of dollars annually. Calculations indicate that illegal log- ging was responsible for the removal of 380,000 ha annually in Sumatra during the last two decades, or comparable to a loss in carbon value of approximately USD 1 billion every year. Ille- gal logging also represents a major loss of revenue and income to the countries involved, estimated by the World Bank to be at least USD 10 billion. In Indonesia, 18 logging syndicates were estimated to reduce revenues of USD 125 million annually to the Indonesian government (INTERPOL-World Bank 2009).
“Te World Bank estimates that the governments of some of
the poorest countries in the world lose over USD 15 billion per year as a result of illegal logging - money that could be spent
improving the lives of their people.” (Worldbank 2008)
As law enforcement increased in parts of Indonesia during the mid 2000’s and especially from 2005-2007, triggered by a focus on illegal logging (Nelleman et al. 2007), a reduction in illegal logging has been noticed in 37 out of the 41 national parks where illegal logging took place, as also reflected in the overall logging reduction described in this report. However, the effect has been mainly temporary. Illegal logging takes place both directly through illegal company operations, but
Figure 1a: Illegal transport and organization of illegal logging by syndicates. Much of the timber is re-sold during transport and thus changes ownership en route, obliterating tracking efforts to trace origins and dilut- ing import-export figures.