NAVY NEWS, OCTOBER 2010


45


Busting the 1940 myth


FOR the last couple of months there has been a general rehearsal in the media of the legend of


1940. How ‘The Few’


Five-star Tars e-st


HOW does Brian Lavery do it? He manages to produce erudite books on an incredibly diverse range of subjects and eras in the RN at an astonishing rate.


Royal Tars: The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 875- 1850 (Conway, £25 ISBN 978- 1844-861255) is no exception, another benchmark volume which covers a millennium of British nautical history. Actually, that’s a slight exaggeration. Britain didn’t exist in 875. Nor did the Royal Navy. And the kernel of this volume is devoted to a 200-year-period which saw the British Fleet rise to pre- eminence in the days of sail. Focusing on that period (1640s-1850), the author provides a rich tapestry of all aspects of life as a Jack Tar – discipline, dress, food, rum, combat – aided by a panoply of published and unpublished sources.


In such a book, which seeks to cover such a lengthy timespan, it would be easy to focus on a few landmark actions and incidents – the Nelsonian battles, Quebec, the Spithead mutiny. And all these feature. But so too do other key elements of the RN of the day such as exploration or amphibious operations.


The author also touches on some rather uncomfortable facets of life in the Navy. One Isaac Wilson managed to convince a court martial that he had been trampled by a goat... rather than fornicating. How the ‘rampaging’ animal unbuttoned Wilson’s shirt and trousers remains a mystery... Despite being punishable by death, homosexuality was not uncommon (although witnesses often found it difficult to describe the act in court), and with the number of boys aboard ships, paedophilia could be an issue, especially involving warrant officers “perhaps because they could use the privacy of their cabins”. With wholesale cuts looming


across the military, it’s worth remembering the ‘peace dividend’ after the end of the Napoleonic Wars when the Royal Navy was cut sevenfold. The men who had delivered victory were metaphorically thrown to the wolves. The streets of London were filled with sailors who turned to begging, while one former matelot walked through the capital with a model ship on his head in the hope of finding employment; the replica could “give the appearance of sea motion” when he nodded. For those still in the Service during the days of Pax Britannica, there was, says the author, surprisingly not too much to distinguish them from their forebears on the Mary Rose 300 years earlier.


Conditions for the lower deck


were still harsh and brutal (and chances of promotion actually fewer). Disease still killed more men than battle. Food was a mainstay of morale. So too rum. And sailors of 1850 lived for the moment just as those of 1545. The 1850s is, believes Brian


Lavery, the watershed decade for Jack, when mechanisation, improving communications and the industrial revolution fundamentally changed the ordinary Jack Tar.


For that story we have to wait for a second volume. We await it eagerly.


Command were the only thing that stood between Britain and invasion and if the air battle had gone the wrong way Britain would have been subjected to Nazi conquest.


response from some readers who do not wish to be confused by the truth, writes Prof Eric Grove of the University of Salford. Never before, however has there been a study with full scholarly apparatus that sets the record straight. This has now been provided by Dr Tony Cumming in The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain (Naval Institute Press, £19.99 ISBN 978-1-59114-160- 0).


The author opens by juxtaposing Churchill’s ‘We shall fi ght them on the beaches’ speech with a message from the PM to C-in-C Home Forces of the following month: “I fi nd it hard to believe that the South Coast is in serious danger at the present time.” After the war Churchill remarked


a predictably furious of Fighter


The Grove Review


The unreality of this legend has been pointed out at various times, including in my column, which produced


expensive Norwegian gamble. Cumming devotes a whole chapter to the effectiveness of bombers against warships. The operations around Crete are often held to demonstrate the power of the Luftwaffe against the Royal Navy.


The author shows conclusively however that even off Crete the RN was


objectives, despite losses he


“The evidence,” argues “indicates


German bomber rily sh


were not necessar a match for British warships in 1940..... the ships and men of the Royal Navy in home waters r e p r e s e n t e d a formidable obstacle to the


bers able to achiev


the RN eve


losses. that


its


Trying this by day was relatively expensive once the Luftwaffe fi nally turned to London where RAF fi ghters based further north could be more effective. So the Luftwaffe began a night offensive while the losses to the London daylight attacks were used as a face saver to allow Sealion to be called off, much to the German Navy’s relief.


most determined invasion attempt.”


ed make a most interesting cr


to Admiral Forbes, C-in-C of the Home Fleet in 1940, that he had never believed an invasion was possible. Forbes replied that he had “camoufl aged it very well.” Although it was not called that at the time, ‘spin’ had clearly been alive and well in 1940.


Cumming quotes the telling remark of Vizeadmiral Kurt Assmann of the German Naval Staff, “we could not simply swim over!” Assman also made it clear that the Naval Staff “appreciated that air supremacy alone could not provide permanent security against vastly superior naval forces in the crossing area.” And British naval forces were indeed “vastly superior,” as the German Navy licked


the losses of their successful but its serious wounds after The author then mo


moves on to esting critique


of the performance of Fighter Command using the often ignored work of Wing Commander ‘Dizzy’ Allen, a Battle of Britain fi ghter pilot.


Even according to the evidence of its commander, Keith Park, 11 Group was not performing well by mid-September.


agree with Allen that the Germans had achieved their objectives over the Channel. Dowding, Fighter Command C-in-C, admitted that his command was becoming much less effective. What was happening, however, was that the Luftwaffe was not interested in invasion. Given the near suicidal


Operation Sealion faced at sea – against which the Luftwaffe could not defend it – Göring was trying to coerce Britain into a negotiated peace by an alternative Attack’ of bombing.


‘Eagle risks Cumming goes so far as to


As cities burned, Dowding was obstinately concentrating on one solution: radar equipped night fi ghters. These were indeed the eventual answer but, as the Germans showed, visually-sighted night fi ghters could have some success. Churchill, perhaps rightly, thought that Fighter Command could have done more.


as obstinately Cumming is much more


sympathetic towards Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, who was given the most unfair nickname ‘Wrong Way


Charlie’. Forbes


opposed deploying too much of the fl eet on direct anti-invasion duties as it unnecessarily, in his opinion, opened up Britain’s vital sea communications to German attack. Certainly the diversion of potential escorts to form part of the ‘wall of England’ caused heavy Allied casualties in the U-boats’ ‘fi rst happy time.’


points out that during the period Cumming


weaknesses of Dowding’s air defence system and suggests that a more offensive Fighter Command posture might have achieved useful results; the aircraft massing on the newly-acquired airfi elds in France were indeed sitting ducks. He also gives a convincing explanation as to why Dowding was controversially dismissed by Churchill. Dowding’s stubborn inability to work with others was becoming too counter-productive as Fighter Command seemed to have no answer to the night offensive. u


newly-acquire France


sit a


to by


dis wdi


inability


too coun as Fighte seemed to h to the night


as ex The author points out the


of the Battle of Britain, some 1,570 merchant seamen were killed in British registered merchant ships compared to Fighter Command’s losses of 537. There is much in his concluding contention that we should regard 1940 not as a limited ‘Battle of Britain’ fought in the air but a multi-dimensional joint ‘Battle for Britain’. An interesting feature of the book is the chapter on how the Battle of Britain myth – expressed especially on fi lm – was important in trying to obtain support from the USA.


This did not have as much effect as might have been hoped. Germany declared war on the USA in December 1941, not vice versa. Perhaps the effect was greater in establishing the myth at home. This chapter rambled a little and there are other small mistakes in the book. Prince of Wales and Repulse were not sunk by Japanese dive bombers; only one of Britain’s carriers (not seven) was available in home waters to support the defences against invasion in the summer of 1940; and the 50 old destroyers transferred in September did turn out to be “a long term practical advantage” for Britain. Perhaps because the author is


concerned with vindicating Forbes, there is not enough detail on the actual naval forces at Immingham, Sheerness,


Portsmouth and


Plymouth, built up against the C-in-C’s will, that stood ready to throw themselves upon the Germans as their barges crawled across the Channel, creating the dream ‘target-rich environment’ For an account of this one has


to turn to Geoff Hewitt’s excellent Hitler’s Armada published by Pen and Sword two years ago. That book might be wrongly dismissed for its lack of source notes. No-one can thus discount


Tony Cumming’s important new work with its meticulous scholarly apparatus. Both


complement each other rather well and together they comprehensively explode the myth of 1940. When will the media notice?


The bigger picture in Helmand


THE Royal Marines can have no better chronicler of their deeds than Ewen Southby-Tailyour – one of their own and a historian to boot.


A couple of years ago, 3 Commando Brigade described the actions of the eponymous RM unit’s six-month tour of duty in Afghanistan over 2006-07.


the winter of


3 Commando Brigade: Helmand Assault (Ebury, £18.99 ISBN 978-0-09-193775-1) follows the brigade’s return to Afghanistan two years down the line for Herrick 9. Southby-Tailyour focuses on


around Nad-e-Ali – witnessed fighting more akin to 1916 than 2008.


Company, 42 Commando, fought three major battles, yomped more than 25 miles and dealt with the constant threat of booby traps and snipers in conditions which the Royals described as “Somme-like” (ie lots of mud). By concentrating on the specific


various ‘set piece’ actions during that six-month spell during which the brigade battlegroup – Royal Marines, matelots, soldiers, Danes – lost 44 men. As a work of military history,


rather than a memoir, Helmand Assault perhaps lacks the immediacy of Matt Croucher’s rattling Bulletproof


Ormrod’s inspirational Man Down. But what the author can offer is


and Mark


expertise, the big picture, and the view from senior officers which ‘ordinary’ marines (if there ever were such an individual...) simply do not have.


anyone in the brigade assisted the retired lieutenant-colonel in compiling this account – affording him unique access to material, in turn giving the reader some unique insights. For example: two out of every


five ‘incidents’ across the whole of Afghanistan last winter occurred in Helmand. The province was the insurgents’ chosen battleground. And so it was that Operation Sond Chara – an 18-day sweep through Taleban strongholds


Pretty much anyone who was


operations, Southby-Tailyour says there’s little time to describe day-to-day life in Helmand. But he does offer snippets. There is no distinct front line in Afghanistan. There is no day without the radio message:


followed by the ter response: ‘Wait out. What happened


on Christmas Eve 2008 was typical. A car headed erratically for the Royals’ lines near Zarghun Kalay. The


‘Contact’, terse ut.’ d


rgh


warnings. The car kept coming. Warning shots. The car kept coming. Three bursts of fire at the vehicle. The car kept coming. “Bloody hell, mate,” one Royal urged his machine-gunner. “Go for it.”


vehicle slewed to a halt. It’s an incident which has probably never been recorded until now, simply because they’re ten-a-penny in Afghanistan. But before we get too hung up on operations such as Sond Chara or the later Aabi Toorah in southern Helmand, it’s worth heeding


force commander Brig Gordon Messenger.


the warning of The windscreen shattered, the commandos


There is no the rad ontact


t line


dio t’, e


is s


offer no in


fer In those 18 days, Lima


Afghanistan there was a dress- rehearsal exercise on Salisbury Plain featuring lots of armour, lots of Royals shouting and lots of


overhead. All well and good, says Brig Messenger. The brigade must be prepared for battle. But it won’t win the day in Helmand. “We need to train for counter insurgency, not for war,” believes. Hearts and minds are the key to success in Afghanistan, mixedm ed with ability to take the battle to the insurgents when necessary. m e


urge


believ y


hun shouted


achieved some tangible successes, not least thanks to the growth of the Afghan Army and the growing influence of the government. And we often wonder – especially in this 70th anniversary year of the Battle of Britain – whether Britons are still cut from the same cloth as the men and women of 1940. Back then, a fabled


Before we beat ourselves up too much, however, Herrick 9 hi


situation down. Before w


ge, the ti


d


language, the ability to calm a potentially inflammatory situation


world they are entering, local customs, languag a poten


local world


man and woman who deploys to Helmand must have a better understanding of the d th


de mu unde


ep ust ers


cu the


ta th n


Every he gunships buzzing around Before the brigade deployed to


She volunteered to step in when the unit medic left C Coy, 1 Rifles. Another volunteer that day was L/Cpl Jon List, who should have been serving in the intelligence cell, but who volunteered for the front-line instead. The patrol took everything


perhaps a hip flask. List was shot in the neck and


last letter from home,


authorised – weapons, medical kit, comms kit, maps, GPS systems – and the odd unauthorised – family photos,


was dying. Nesbitt rushed in to offer life-saving treatment, despite the admonishments of an officer to keep her head down as bullets whipped past her. “I know I’m being fucking shot at but I’m trying to save Listy’s life here,” she growled at the officer. “Now bloody well hold on to this.” Her actions earned her the first female MC in the Royal Navy. The foe might change. So too the theatre. But not, says the author, “the patois of combat”.


inexpensive books


No peace in the Pacifi c


A FEW months ago we brought you news of WW2: The Lost Films, the History Channel’s excellent panoramic sweep of the 1939-45 war using a great deal of unseen private (and invariably colour) footage. Well, if you’re not worn out by that 600-minute documentary fest, here’s just short of seven hours of wartime footage, interviews and graphic recreations focusing entirely on the war with Japan to keep you occupied as the nights draw in. Like the same channel’s Lost Films, the five-DVD Pacific: Hell on Earth (Go Entertain, £19.99 released October 18) is American-centric charting the conflict from Pearl Harbor through the fighting at Midway, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, to the surrender in Tokyo Bay.


Those battles are recounted using a mix of survivors’ testimonies, archive footage and computer recreations. There’s been a glut of Pacific-related documentaries recently (featuring ‘Pacific’ and ‘hell’ in the title) possibly to cash in on the impressive Tom Hanks mini-series which aired on Sky over the summer (and is issued on DVD next month). Pacific: Hell on Earth is no exception, for one of central characters in Hanks’ series – Eugene ‘Sledgehammer’ Sledge – is included here on a 45-minute bonus documentary.


HP BOOKFINDERS: Established professional service locating out of print titles on all subjects. No obligation or SAE required. Contact: Mosslaird, Brig O’ Turk, Callander, FK17 8HT Telephone/Fax: (01877) 376377 martin@hp-bookfinders.co.uk www.hp-bookfinders.co.uk


task


embodied the best of British. They still exist. They could be found, for example, near Patrol Base Jaker on the morning of March 12 2009. The patrol was typical of the actions during Herrick 9 – and of the make-up of Allied forces scattered around Helmand: Royal Marines, soldiers, Afghan troops, and one naval medic, MA Kate Nesbitt.


‘few’


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