Automotive


validate OTA updates before allowing them to be installed.


For many years, vehicles have communicated between their ECUs using Controller Area Network (CAN bus). The drawback here is its lack of focus on security. CAN FD (Flexible Data- rate) offers additional payload bytes, allowing the addition of CAN MAC (Message Authentication Codes). Ethernet connectivity is also now making inroads into automotive, and there is a lot of experience about how to secure these networks. Making a hardware system secure typically starts with a secure boot. This stage is followed by message authentication, both of which depend on truly secure key storage.


Ideally, an automotive security solution would be based on adding layers of new security features, rather than completely redesigning all the electronics.


Automotive designers must defend more attack surfaces


E-MAR16-030-E-TEC_Layout 1 10/03/2016 16:54 Page 1


People are familiar with smartphones and computers and know how often they must be updated to fix security vulnerabilities. Cars


can be thought of as the most sophisticated consumer Internet of Things (IoT) devices. They have a similar attack surface to smartphones and computers, so each attack surface must be continuously defended. Best practice for automotive OEMs when seeking to provide cybersecurity is to ensure that only authorized software is loaded and run— this is known as a secure boot operation. Only the authorized ECUs are allowed from the dozens of ECUs communicating with electronic messaging. These messages are authenticated using the AES block cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) algorithm. Before they are allowed to change any content, firmware update signatures are cryptographically verified. Even the traffic within each electronic network should be inspected on each port. This is essential to ensure that only valid packets are allowed.


An approach to secure the entire car: from boot to connected system Microchip offers solutions for automotive cybersecurity and secure boot, which only allows authenticated content to


Obsolete Chip?


E-tec offers a range of competitively priced package adaptors to solve obsolete package problems. These high quality adaptors are typically produced in 1.6mm thickness material or where the upper footprint interferes with the lower footprint then 2.4mm material is used. Here the pins are fitted into blind holes from below and the combination of a press fit and a solder fillet around the pin shoulder provides a reliable and robust connection.


Daughter boards can be created to customer requirements and raised pins are available to raise the complete assemble off the pcb to the required level.


E-tec welcomes special adaptor enquiries, send the chip package details for the top and bottom parts and we will respond promptly with a quotation.


run. This is provided by the CryptoAutomotive security IC, the TrustAnchor100 (TA100). To avoid designers needing to redesign their entire systems,


this external Hardware Security Module (HSM)


provides multiple security features: • Secure boot


• Authentication of CAN messages • Electric Vehicle (EV) battery management system and module authentication • Message encryption with Transport Layer Security (TLS)


• Support for Wireless Power Consortium Qi 1.3 authentication


• Cryptographic verification of the source of the module manufacturer


Compared to redesigning a new MCU to add security features, the Microchip approach saves both cost and design time. Changes to the MCU code will have little effect on the host MCU functional safety ratings. The TA100 comes already programmed with


TA100 14-pin SOIC socket board


security features, allowing it to be learned rapidly without the aid of a cyber-security expert. MCU code changes are very minor, reducing project risk.


These types of innovations make it easier to achieve cybersecurity in automotive design, helping to safely accelerate the drive to autonomous vehicles.


www.microchip.com


t: 01892 530260 f: 01892 515560 e: info@e-tec.co.uk


www.e-tec.co.uk


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