Carbon capture and storage |
What lessons can we learn from past projects?
How basic precautions can greatly reduce the risks of technical failure for future power CCS projects Jon Gibbins and Mathieu Lucquiaud University of Sheffield, UK
Lessons for the next wave of CCS power plant deployment might be learned from looking at what we know of the small number of previous CCS power plant projects, as well as experience from previous periods of innovation in power plant technology.
To date the biggest perceived problem in the power CCS sector has been that proposed projects will fail to get enough government support to make them commercially viable. But, as a recent report by IEEFA (Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis), The carbon capture crux: lessons learned, has highlighted, power CCS projects that did get support and made a positive final investment decision (FID) have all subsequently had significant technical problems.
The sample is small – just three projects – but the fact that out of these three projects two are not operating and one appears, at least for a time, to have had excessively high operating costs for solvent management strongly suggests that it would be advisable to take steps to ensure that analogous technical problems do not occur in the future.
It is worth noting that the consequences of technical failures post-FID in the next wave of CCS power projects are much more severe for society as a whole than for many of those involved in the up-front decisions that will largely lock-in the subsequent technical outcomes. Conflicts of interest may therefore result in technology-related decisions being taken that are not in the wider interests of society at large, which (directly, through taxes, or via unavoidable charges on future energy bills) is expected to subsidise them.
For those with a stake in a particular technology, such as its proprietors, project development teams that have selected the technology, and those involved in funding its previous development, a large-scale project that goes ahead, even with relatively high technology risks, is likely to be preferable to no project at all. If a project is not selected for government FEED support, or if it subsequently fails to make FID, then the technology may be abandoned, while, obviously, if it does go ahead the project may be successful in proving the technology. Anyway, for many technology proprietors the financial risk exposure will be limited, possibly to very low levels indeed (ie, some fraction of a licence fee), while project development team members and project selectors may well feel that problems that might occur five or more years after their first goal, FID, is achieved are too remote to worry seriously about. However, for society as a whole, the risks are likely to be more consequential. These include any financial losses that, notwithstanding a nominal position that ‘industry takes all the risks’, may result in wasted taxpayer subsidies or impact on investors acting on behalf of large numbers of people. But, much more seriously, there is a real risk that, if a second wave of implemented CCS power projects comes anywhere near the proportion of technical failures seen previously, then power CCS, on fossil fuels and on biomass and wastes, will not subsequently be deployed as rapidly and widely as it needs to be to help stop dangerous climate change.
Fortunately, experience gained on the projects so far suggests that the measures that need to be taken to avoid a repeat of past problems are very simple:
● For the default solvent-based post- combustion capture technologies, be able to change to another solvent if necessary and test solvent management and corrosion performance for as long as possible in advance of deployment, and continue to test after deployment, to give advance warning of any problems. Solvent changes might also be needed if unforeseen problems emerge due to environmental emissions or workers’ safety.
● For ‘disruptive’ technologies that, for example, use new high-temperature fuel processing stages (eg, gasifiers, combustors) or novel rotating machinery (eg, turbines) don’t scale up by more than a factor of two and verify long-term (ie, two years or more) successful operation of the specific technology at realistic operating conditions before doing so In addition, although likely not to be the direct responsibility of the power CCS project developers, make sure that multiple, independent CO2
storage options are available.
It is inevitable that there will be incomplete knowledge of the geology at any storage site (except, perhaps, for depleted gas fields), as evidenced by initial plans for saline aquifer storage not being able to be realised in several
implemented projects. Sites that transport CO2 to storage by ship obviously have very good optionality in this respect, if not constrained contractually.
The evidence underlying the recommendation to be able to switch post-combustion capture (PCC) solvents and to conduct very long-term testing is reported at length in a Best Available Technology (BAT) review previously undertaken
Above: Three CCS power plant projects: From left to right: Kemper under construction; Boundary Dam power plant; Petra Nova carbon capture plant
16 | October 2022|
www.modernpowersystems.com
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