POLICY & FINANCE | CREATING A STABLE FRAMEWORK An important development has been talks between
Vattenfall and Industrikraft, which gathers 14 companies including key Swedish industrial players. Industrikraft could take a stake in Videberg and exert influence on future coalitions to ensure projects move forward, though the extent remains uncertain. Beyond the headline instruments, transaction structure
matters. Investors and lenders will parse how strike prices are indexed, how construction cost overruns are shared, what completion guarantees apply, and how outage and performance risks are allocated post-COD. Even with strong state involvement, the balance between merchant exposure and policy-backed revenue stability determines the cost of capital – and ultimately the levelised cost of electricity offered to consumers and industry. In the Netherlands, since 2023 the government has
allocated significant funding, including €320m in the 2024 Climate Fund for nuclear projects such as extending Borssele and building two new reactors. By 2024, plans expanded to €14bn by 2035 to support four reactors, though opposition parties questioned the use of the Climate Fund. Hans Schoenmakers, Netherlands Country Manager at
Last Energy, explained: “The reluctance of most investors in large nuclear to bear the costs and risks alone means the government must explore a state-backed entity to support new nuclear projects, ensuring long-term commitment.” An unnamed source from the Ministry of Economic Affairs
confirmed that cost dominates the debate. Another source from the Ministry of Climate Policy and Green Growth noted that, given the country’s favourable debt-to-GDP ratio, companies aim to minimise risk exposure. Financing models proposed by vendors will be a key selection criterion, and the government seeks viable financial partners to mitigate risks.
This demonstrates how political contestation over funding can directly threaten project viability, even when technical and environmental arguments are clear. In a state-led model, budget prioritisation competes with other policy goals, and the form of support – equity injections, guarantees, revenue stabilisation – becomes a proxy
fight over the proper role of the state in capital-intensive infrastructure. Where coalitions are fragile, financing packages tend to be revisited, prolonging uncertainty for supply chains and local stakeholders.
Licensing, acceptance, and capability Licensing is often framed as a purely technical pathway, but in practice it is also a governance test. Scope, sequencing, and the integration of environmental assessments can shorten or lengthen critical paths by years. Sweden’s and the Netherlands’ approaches both stress safety and transparency, yet they differ in how responsibilities are distributed between utilities, ministries, and the regulator. Where ministries lead (Dutch model), the bottleneck risk shifts toward administrative capacity; where utilities lead (Swedish model), financing credibility and long-term policy guarantees play a larger role. Public acceptance is equally pivotal. In both countries, industrial demand for firm, low-carbon power – especially from chemicals, metals, and data centres – provides a political counterweight to opposition. Still, local consultations, land-use constraints, and perceptions of fairness (who bears construction disruption and who benefits) can tilt timelines. Community-benefit agreements, local training programmes, and clear decommissioning provisions are increasingly seen as necessary complements to national-level policy signals. Finally, capability: after multi-decade pauses in new build
across Europe, project governance and supply-chain depth are not automatic. Both Sweden and the Netherlands face a need to rebuild specialised skills – from civil nuclear project management and QA/QC to welding, NDE, and digital I&C integration. Political instability compounds this problem by disrupting workforce planning and vendor mobilisation. Conversely, stable cross-party frameworks can anchor supply-chain investment and enable standardisation across fleet projects, reducing cost and risk over time.
Creating political stability Nuclear new build projects operate on industrial timelines of 10–20 years and once operating have lifespans of 40-80 years, colliding with electoral cycles of four to five years. Coalition politics, shifting budgets, and public opinion create persistent friction. Sweden and the Netherlands exemplify these structural
Above: Decades of policy reversals, public protests, and regulatory shifts illustrate how political dynamics can override technical considerations
18 | November 2025 |
www.neimagazine.com
vulnerabilities. In Sweden, decades of policy reversals, public protests, and regulatory shifts illustrate how political dynamics can override technical considerations. Recent financing mechanisms are designed to insulate new projects from political swings, but risks remain. In the Netherlands, coalition instability and evolving ministerial structures have slowed progress despite broad parliamentary support. Both models – Sweden’s market-driven approach and the Netherlands’ state-centred planning – remain exposed to political uncertainty. Sweden demonstrates how industry- led development can provide resilience if coupled with strong guarantees, while the Netherlands highlights the fragility of projects when administrative capacity and coalition politics intersect. For Europe’s broader energy security goals, these cases suggest that durable, cross- party policy frameworks, aligned institutional roles, and credible long-term financing arrangements are as decisive as technology choice in shaping outcomes. ■
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