CREATING A STABLE FRAMEWORK | POLICY & FINANCE


Above: To secure nuclear expansion, the Swedish government has introduced a three-part financing programme including state loans, Contracts for Difference, and risk-sharing mechanisms Source: Fortum


Utilities like Vattenfall and Fortum lead project development with relative autonomy in technology choices, relying on their expertise and international industrial support for plant construction. Carl Berglöf, Sweden’s National Nuclear New-Build Coordinator, noted in an interview with NEi that: “Utilities, supported by vendors, have the expertise to manage new reactor projects, in contrast to the government, which lacks such capabilities, though the domestic industry relies on industrial capabilities from other countries to construct the plants.” Tobias Andersson, Member of the Riksdag, Sweden’s


governing body, emphasised that while the government appoints Vattenfall’s board, it avoids direct interference in supplier decisions to prevent delays from public procurement laws. Yet political influence persists through financing mechanisms and government pressure on utilities. First, the current coalition has put heavy pressure on


Vattenfall to invest in new reactors. Vattenfall’s staff is said to be divided, between those in favour of renewables and those who believe the utility should accompany the government’s desire for more nuclear power. The government is keen to see Vattenfall commit to new build in the coming months, ahead of elections, while Vattenfall must ensure profitability and adequate state guarantees. Second, the state exerts influence through financing mechanisms. Rickard Nordin, a member of the Riksdag from an opposition party, explained that a new government might question the current coalition’s state support. However, recent signals from the Social Democrats supporting new reactors suggest growing cross-party alignment. Still, there is a sentiment that a potential Red-Green government post-2026 might pause nuclear expansion, which could pose risks to investors. Third, all stakeholders consulted highlighted politics


as the main risk for projects, particularly in the event of a change of majority in Sweden’s next parliamentary


elections. Patricia Kempf from Industrikraft Sverige, a coalition representing the interests of Swedish industries, noted that political risk remains but expressed hope that given the high stakes, strong guarantees will be offered by the state in the coming months. Hence, Sweden’s model brings a more market-driven


approach, where utilities manage tenders and technology choices, while the state provides financial backing. Yet the model is reliant on long-term political stability. From a delivery perspective, Sweden’s legacy nuclear fleet and related supply chain provide a partial institutional memory for new build, but long gaps in construction still create challenges. Workforce planning, component qualification, and interface management between owner, EPC, and regulator all become more complex when political signals fluctuate over time. As a result, utilities push for clarity not only on headline targets but also on the practical contours of state support, liability frameworks, and the pacing of permitting. Local acceptance also matters. While surveys suggest


evolving views on nuclear in Sweden, siting decisions and the distribution of benefits – jobs, infrastructure investment, local tax revenues – remain politically salient. Municipalities and regional authorities frequently seek binding commitments on community benefits and decommissioning funds, aligning project milestones with broader industrial development strategies.


The Netherlands and new build In the Netherlands, nuclear new-build is state-centred. The technology supplier would be selected in cabinet, with responsibility falling directly to ministers and the governing coalition. In 2022, the government proposed new projects to


expand capacity, responding to climate imperatives and energy security concerns. By 2025, however, progress slowed due to coalition instability and competing legislative


www.neimagazine.com | November 2025 | 15


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