SAFETY & SECURITY | IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS


and the upgraded reactor in Arak as well as theNPP IR- 300 NPP being built at Darkhovin in Khuzestan. Future plans include:


● Aerial exploration of uranium in more than half of Iran; ● Design and construction of a uranium ore processing plant and a yellow cake production unit (in situ leaching);


● Design and construction of a conversion plant for the production of uranium oxide and UF6;


● Design and construction of a plant for the production of zirconium cladding, fuel lines and fuel assemblies for light water reactors and plate fuel for TRR, including quality control and pre-radiation tests;


● Design and construction of infrastructure for irradiating fuel samples and testing after exposure.


● Iran is also developing accident tolerant nuclear fuel and is considering the design and construction of pre-burial and near-surface disposal facilities for low- and medium- level radioactive waste.


International agreements After years of contentious negotiations moderated by the IAEA, Iran signed the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 group of countries (the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China plus Germany) under which it agreed to limit its nuclear development programme in return for the lifting of sanctions. However, in response to the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018, Iran resumed nuclear construction and enrichment activities after notifying the IAEA. While limited IAEA inspections of its nuclear activities


Below:


Bushehr Unit 1 was connected to the grid in 2011 and in 2014 a contract was signed for the construction of the second and third units


have continued, interactions with the IAEA have been reduced while Iran’s nuclear development has continued apace. During the recent IAEA General Conference, the AEOI outlined its future plans at a side event, 50 Years of Nuclear Technology in Iran: Success Stories. According to AEOI officials, three nuclear power reactors are currently under construction in Iran and site and technology selection for another is underway. Further nuclear fuel cycle and research reactor development is also planned. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi recently held


talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, one of the key architects of the 2015 JCPOA. “What I see is an expressed willingness to re-engage with us in a more meaningful fashion,” Grossi told Reuters afterwards. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in his speech


to the UN General Assembly indicated that Iran was ready to restart talks on reactivating the JCPOA. “If the deal’s


commitments are implemented fully and in good faith, dialogue on other issues can follow,” he said. A series of Western-sponsored IAEA board resolutions


ordering Iran to cooperate urgently with investigations into the uranium traces and calling on it to reverse its barring of inspectors have served only to make Iran further reduce co-operation with the Agency. Asked about the prospects of a revival of nuclear talks,


Grossi said the preparatory work needed to start now, notably for the IAEA to get the necessary clarity on Iran’s activities since it reduced cooperation with the agency. “I think we need to, or the ambition should be to get results in a different way, because the old way is simply not going to be possible anymore,” he said. Vladimir Sazhin, senior researcher at the Institute of


Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences told Vedmosti that there is no longer any hope for the revival of the JCPOA in its previous form. He pointed out that the level of development of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure has grown significantly compared with 2018, and that the JCPOA formally ends in 2025. For these reasons, new negotiations will have to take into account the current conditions. He noted that the Iranian economy and its socio-political situation are still heavily impacted by sanctions. In return for their removal, Tehran will agree not to create nuclear weapons, but will not dismantle the centrifuges already built or destroy its stockpiles of enriched uranium. However, Sazhin does not believe that any serious negotiations can take place before the inauguration of the new US president in January 2025 and that for now there can only be some “intelligence” contacts. However, any hopes of reviving the JCPOA are on now hold and possibly dead. After 16 months of indirect US- Iranian talks, with the EU shuttling between the parties, talks ended in September 2022 when the US pulled out of the negotiations and tightened its sanctions on Iran. Since then, tensions in the region have increased to the point where Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities are now expected. On 1 October, Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel in response to a series of assassinations of prominent Iranian and Palestinian figures. This prompted further US sanctions. Israel subsequently threatened to deliver a “deadly, pinpoint accurate, and surprising” retaliation, with some Israeli officials calling for strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure, including nuclear facilities. Iran, in turn has said any strike on its territory will result in massive retaliation. Iranian parliamentarians recently called on the Supreme


National Security Council to review the country’s defence doctrine to remove the ban on developing nuclear weapons. However, Iran has long prohibited nuclear weapons and Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, ratifying it in 1970. Israel, on the other hand, has refused to sign the NPT. US officials reportedly have urged Israel not to target


Iran’s energy or nuclear facilities, hoping to avoid a major regional war in the run up to the US presidential election. Following the recent very limited Israeli attack on Iran, it appears that the warning was heeded. However, whether this is the end of retaliatory strikes remains to be seen. It is also unclear how the outcome of the US election may affect future developments. Meanwhile, regional tensions continue, with Iran still taking precautions against a possible future major attack on its nuclear infrastructure. ■


44 | November 2024 | www.neimagazine.com


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