DAVID HESS | OPINION


Countries remain very much open to doing business with Russia and are more than happy to consider Russian nuclear offerings. Indeed, Russia has a firm hold on many of the most advanced nuclear newcomer nations which have yet to break ground on their first plant


the most recent and notable example of Russia’s nuclear export success is Ethiopia, where a cooperation agreement has just been signed. Niger too has reportedly also just said it is interested in building a 2000 MW nuclear plant. Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa. Niger is yet another uranium producing nation, which has made recent headlines by ejecting Orano from operating the Somair mine and beginning the process of nationalisation. In other words, these are not just any African countries, they are strategically important ones. This is not an exhaustive list of Russian nuclear prospects and doesn’t even attempt to be. There are many other countries where Russia will be the leading candidate as nuclear partner nation. There are of course excellent reasons why these countries end up preferring and ultimately selecting Rosatom as their nuclear technology partner. First and foremost, there is clearly nothing wrong with the technology spectrum, which encompasses a range of VVER designs with different plant configurations to suit different requirements, as well as small modular reactors, floating nuclear power plants and even potentially fast neutron reactors. Although this last is clearly not intended for newcomers. The track record of the VVERs is evidently comparable to other pressurised water reactor designs when it comes to metrics such as construction duration and capacity factor. On the all-important construction cost metric, the


Russian industry appears to be capable of building nuclear plants abroad in the range of US$4000 – 5000/kW which is the current published estimate for the 2.4 GW Rooppur plant Rosatom is building in Bangladesh. This is significantly cheaper than the first of a kind costs of AP1000 and EPR units built in their home markets. Whatever the benefits or drawbacks of the VVER design from an operational perspective, the Russian supply chain is clearly capable of delivering.


It does not end there. The Russian nuclear export offer


typically consists of other features that sets them miles apart from all vendor nations, and especially for newcomer countries. The first of these is financing, where low-cost Russian state loans are a very normal feature of a nuclear plant deal. For the countries which struggle to find the necessary billions on their national balance sheets and which can’t seem to secure financing from international financial institutions, this is clearly a godsend. For those countries that perceive they will struggle with the complexities of nuclear project management, Russian


deals are typically structured on a turnkey basis. Rosatom finds all the partners required to put the plant together and ensures nuclear quality is maintained throughout. For those that perhaps shirk at putting together a skilled operating company, the Russian nuclear package can go a step further and be structured on a build-own-operate basis. Of course, if a country would prefer to ultimately create their own qualified pool of skilled nuclear workers, and let’s face it who wouldn’t – well Russia has this covered too. The Russian nuclear university MEPHi brings students in from all over the world on scholarships, training them for various nuclear roles. It is truly one of the unrecognised gems of the industry.


And on the fuel side, Russia pretty much insists on long-


term contracts for fuel supply which is probably where the real money is ultimately made, since the other terms are so attractive. Fuel is what creates the long-term strategic relationship with the buying country. However, it is on the backend of the fuel cycle where the offer gets truly exceptional, with the option of fuel take-back. Rosatom will repatriate the fuel, reprocess it and then store both the useful elements and the final waste for a (non-defined) period of time. Against this integrated offer almost all other vendors


are dramatically under-equipped. They are incapable or unwilling to offer the full suite of financing, turnkey contract, training or fuel-cycle benefits. What they do claim to offer, and especially the start-up small modular reactor companies, is superior technology, but these claims are essentially unverified at this stage. How does one actually measure ‘advancedness’? It is not yet evident that they offer a faster, easier, more secure, more sustainable or more cost- effective path to market in newcomer countries – which is almost certainly what these countries value most. If other vendors are really to compete with Rosatom in


newcomer markets, then it seems clear that the nations backing them need to step up. The focus on technology is nowhere near enough. Whatever one thinks of Putin, his commitment and


leadership on nuclear energy is clear. He spoke at World Atomic Week recently, recognising peaceful nuclear technologies “as the basis for international cooperation and bringing states closer together”. For Western nuclear vendors and government there is no point moaning about it. If they want to challenge the Russian nuclear bear then they need to come up with a better package deal. ■


There are excellent reasons why these countries end up preferring and ultimately selecting Rosatom as their nuclear technology partner. First and foremost, there is clearly nothing wrong with the technology spectrum, which encompasses a range of VVER designs with different plant configurations to suit different requirements


www.neimagazine.com | October 2025 | 17


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