1971 | FROM THE ARCHIVE
Caledonian golf balls and fast neutrons
By John C.H. Lindberg FRSA
The focus of the August issue fifty years ago was the Prototype Fast Reactor, and the UK’s follow-on plans for a commercial fast-breeder fleet. What lessons can be learned from these ambitious plans, which never materialised?
operations by 1981. These plans never materialised, as support for the programme started to decline as the economic case for breeders weakened, technical issues arose and there was a shift towards PWRs as the future reactor design in the UK. The UKAEA’s ambition of having
at least 15GWe of fast-breeder reactors by 1986 clearly never materialised, and neither did the demand for fuel recycling. What lessons can we draw from
this?
When looking at the announcements and visions provided by the UK nuclear industry in the late 1960s, it becomes very clear that words are cheap and that making promises that you cannot fulfil will come back to haunt you. This remains as true today as it
Above: PFR wallchart from 1971
There are few nuclear sites in the world as iconic as Dounreay on the north coast of Scotland. Set amongst miles and miles of rolling hills frequently battered by the winds of the North Atlantic and on jagged cliffs that are common in the area, Dounreay was once a world-leading research centre for fast reactor technology. In 1962, the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) — its white ball-shaped dome visible for miles — was the world’s first fast reactor to provide electricity to a national grid. In the August 1971 edition of Nuclear Engineering International, the UK Atomic Energy Agency
(UKAEA) described plans for the development of the DFR’s successor, the Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR). This 250MWe, sodium-cooled, MOX-fuelled, pool-type reactor was to be the bridge between R&D and the UKAEA’s ambitious fast-reactor expansion plans. The PFR was announced in 1966,
reached first criticality in 1974, and began generating electricity in January the following year. Like many other prototype
reactors, PFR faced a number of issues, often related to sodium leaks that required repairs. The reactor continued to experience
issues and it was clear that it was not able to operate as reliably as had been promised. According to the World Nuclear
Association’s Reactor Database, the PFR had a cumulative load factor of 26.9% by the time the reactor was shut down in 1994, following the 1988 decision by the UK government to slash fast reactor R&D funding by 90%. The PFR was meant to be the
predecessor of a commercial fast-breeder reactor with an installed capacity of 1300MWe. Start of construction was initially slated for 1974 (with the prototype operational by 1972) and
did back then, and developers of new nuclear designs — especially Generation IV — would do well to heed the warning provided by history. Nuclear innovation is incredibly
exciting and new designs can play a huge role in expanding the applications for nuclear energy and helping the rehabilitate the industry’s public image. But whilst it is human instinct to
exaggerate to ensure something happens, it is prudent (albeit boring!) to under-promise and over-deliver. Examples of the consequences of over-promising and under- delivering are plentiful, and we must ensure that Generation IV nuclear power does not join them in the junkyard of history. ■
The PFR was meant to be the predecessor of a commercial fast-breeder reactor with an installed capacity of 1300MWe. Start of construction was initially slated for 1974 and operations by 1981. These plans never materialised
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