SAFETY & SECURITY | NEW SECURITY DOCTRINE
connections, primary circuit piping, or heat exchange surfaces of steam generators. In prolonged ‘cold shutdown’ the primary circuit coolant enriched with aggressive boric acid can penetrate intergranular cracks, which become more permeable and vulnerable to chemical corrosion at low temperatures, especially under uncontrolled cyclic loads. This is a direct pathway to degradation and hidden failures. A second example is the degradation of steam generator
Over four years of war in Ukraine have shown that, under the right conditions, nuclear power plants like Rivne can become decisive stabilisers of the power grid during missile and drone attacks. Source: Uatom
Turning nuclear plants into islands of stability means
creating ecosystems of local consumers around the plant. For example, microgrids combining nuclear, solar, battery and AI
centres provides additional flexibility for: ● Creating reserves of energy and controllable loads to support nuclear plant operation during crises, enabling safe shutdown or restoration of power output
● Avoiding dangerous operational modes caused by severe grid disturbances
● Autonomous nuclear operation during loss of external power and performing cold/black start without emergency diesel generators
● Restoring power supply to the region or even the entire grid using nuclear power
However, a critical factor is that the territory of a nuclear plant and its associated switchyards, transformer stations, and cooling systems must not be targeted. This is mandated by the Geneva Conventions and this international protection is significant, says Balakan.
Building on operational experience The paper observes that Ukraine’s experience has revealed that the system of international safeguards is weak and physical protection barriers have a low reliability threshold. In addition, the paper suggests a new factor has emerged in the form of state actors executing nuclear blackmail and sabotage. The world has proved unable to respond quickly or adequately to the scale of such threats given existing emergency response strategies did not anticipate such a sequence of failures, nor did they consider them possible. Combat operations, occupation, and the loss of operational control by Ukraine has fundamentally changed
understanding of: ● The principle of single failure ● Common cause failure
The paper identifies several examples which illustrate
why safety requirements and operational strategies must be reconsidered for nuclear installations held for long periods in operational states never intended to last months, let alone years, notably hot or cold shutdown especially under conditions of loss of cooling sources, loss of external power supply, and low residual heat levels in reactor cores and spent fuel pools. At Zaporizhia, for example, the lack of coolant circulation and the potential for temperatures to drop below 35oC can cause crystallisation of boric acid in the primary circuit particularly in stagnant zones such as impulse line
24 | June 2026 |
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heat exchange surfaces during long-term hot shutdown at Zaporizhia and the risk of thermal shock to the reactor vessel in the event of a steam line or feedwater pipe rupture, when low residual heat levels increase susceptibility to rapid cooling. New conditions have also emerged for the long term supply of feedwater to the steam generators at the plant, especially when using feedwater of degraded chemical quality over extended periods. Such conditions pose a threat to the integrity of steam generator tubing which separates the primary and secondary circuits. Given that ZNPP reactor units have not operated at power
for more than 7–12 months, the low residual heat in the reactor core has allowed consideration of new possibilities for heat removal, as well as more time before the onset of uncompensated primary circuit coolant loss and signs of core damage in the event of a complete failure of safety and feed systems. Nonetheless, such factors increase uncertainly in operational safety that can also be clouded or exploited further by bad actors.
A roadmap to improved security In a world experiencing a renaissance of nuclear technologies, especially SMRs and micro reactors, the architecture of physical protection and the management of nuclear energy sources takes on a new meaning. The paper states that time and wartime experience have shown that the nuclear sector requires a transformation of its safety architecture, with stronger functions and guarantees. New safeguards are needed, not only protection from an inactive regulator or a disoriented, circumstance dependent operating organisation unable to exercise previously declared control over nuclear technology. Instead, Balakan says, what is required is a new paradigm for international institutions, safety rules, interaction mechanisms, independence, and crisis response authority. This new security architecture must not be constrained
by the technology owner, have independent analytical tools, be flexible and decisive, and able to act proactively. The foundation of this architecture is knowledge, access
to information, resources, and top tier specialists whose defining qualities are reputation, unquestionable authority, independence from corporate and institutional constraints, and guaranteed safety. This must be a powerful international centre concentrating the world’s best specialists, databases, and a secure network that integrates knowledge management components and artificial intelligence under strict protocols, equipped with strong analytical and predictive tools for identifying escalation attempts. Maintaining a critical core of experts capable of
anticipating threats, assessing real time risk levels, critical timelines, and potential consequences is essential for emergency response, neutralisation, mitigation, and prevention of severe states. Creating such a new security structure will influence nuclear insurance risks and provide safety guarantees against terrorist and sabotage threats, risks that are difficult to predict but must not become a
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