NEW SECURITY DOCTRINE | SAFETY & SECURITY


disturbances continue due to ongoing missile and drone attacks. The paper notes that under such conditions, operational demands increased dramatically and operation at non-design grid frequencies and on house load buses became essential. These interconnected factors define new requirements for equipment, systems, safety analyses, and necessary modifications. Nonetheless, Ukraine transformed its nuclear plants from a potential vulnerability into sources of stability and survival during a modern military conflict. The paper does not disclose detailed information about


the protocols themselves or their implementation. Balakan argues that doing so during an active conflict would be unsafe but notes that the Ukrainian experience is unique and invaluable and provides an opportunity to rethink emergency response systems and operational resilience. The outcome is a set of measures and innovative solutions that can be adapted and scaled to nuclear plants operating or being designed worldwide. Laying the foundation for rethinking global nuclear safety rules and building a system capable of withstanding the


threats of the 21st century The Doctrine proposes: ● A new category of “next generation beyond design threats” ● An updated model of physical and cyber protection ● An architecture of nuclear power plant resilience under crisis conditions


● Mechanisms for autonomy and energy system recovery ● International instruments of collective defence against hybrid threats


Creating islands of stability The ability of NPPs to maintain operational and safety stability while supplying power to the grid significantly


increases the chances of survival during crises involving: ● Loss of external power supply ● Significant frequency fluctuations and reactive power surges in the grid and plant equipment


● Cascading failures, switching operations, and protection system activations caused by harmonic oscillations, load shedding, and asynchronous grid behaviour


● Destabilisation and loss of traditional energy sources, balancing and rotating capacities, and major consumers


Ukraine’s experience has shown that light water reactors


are highly sensitive to major frequency disturbances in the power grid and that dangerous modes can develop within seconds and last only 10s of seconds, during which emergency reactor trips become unavoidable. New algorithms for response, power control, and


operational safety are thus required for nuclear plants located in regions of potential military threat and the need


for nuclear balancing capability has increased sharply. This must be achieved without violating nuclear fuel cycle or equipment loading constraints. Adjustments to the design basis and equipment


modifications are necessary to ensure operational and safety resilience of nuclear power plants. The goal is not only to increase the operational reliability of nuclear plants during conflict and unforeseen natural or technological disasters, but also to create an energy ecosystem around each plant that is capable of surviving autonomously during a complete blackout of the national power grid. Flexible protocols for managing electrical and thermal power during reactor load reduction are operational algorithms designed specifically for wartime and crisis conditions, technological and natural hazards, and new


transitional process phenomena. These protocols include: ● Stabilising plant equipment at safe power levels before grid disturbances begin, regardless of how short the interval is between a potential threat and the possible impact on the power system


● Modifying equipment and systems to expand operational reliability and balancing functions without violating nuclear fuel cycle or equipment loading constraints


● Preventing emergency shutdowns and beyond design phenomena caused by cascading losses of active and reactive power consumers, harmonic oscillations, and asynchronous grid behaviour


● Ensuring safe transition of nuclear plant generators to house load mode for extended operation until the grid is restored


● Remote dispatch control of nuclear plant power output under severe time constraints and communication disruptions during missile attacks


● Using the balancing potential of nuclear power plants when traditional generation loses its balancing and rotating capacities


The ideal objective is to keep nuclear power plants


operating through the ability to run on house load or local microgrids, and to also perform cold/black start to stabilise the grid during crisis conditions. Under such conditions, the concept of crisis resilient


NPPs, combined with hybrid microgrids around the plant – creating islands of stability and safety – is a core element of the new architecture. This is part of the broader concept of a distributed energy system. Therefore, hybrid use of solar power plants (PV), battery energy storage (BES), mining and AI operational centres co located with operating nuclear power plants also becomes part of nuclear safety, stability, and the self protection of the unified nuclear complex.


A new nuclear safety architecture is particularly relevant currently given heightened geopolitical tension. Source: ENEC


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