1992 | FROM THE ARCHIVE


The Nuclear Dragon By John C.H. Lindberg FRSA


In just 30 years China has grown from a nuclear beginner to a nuclear powerhouse and there’s plenty of scope left for more. Where next for the ‘Nuclear Dragon’?


In the 30 years since, China has Above: The Linglong one SMR under construction


To any casual observer of the nuclear industry today, it is abundantly clear that China holds a central role in the expansion of nuclear energy. Indeed, over the past decade, as a country China alone has been responsible for the majority of growth as far as new nuclear reactors are concerned. And this is a trend that continues, with 19 of the 56 reactors currently under construction worldwide being found in China. It doesn’t stop here, however.


China is also continuing with its long-term policy of building up its domestic capabilities, pushing the boundaries when it comes to various advanced reactor designs and SMRs. Late 2021 saw unit 1 of the high-temperature gas-cooled Shidao Bay-1 pebble bed reactor come online, with unit 2 scheduled to follow behind very soon. Elsewhere, construction has begun on a light-water 125MWe SMR at the Changjiang-1 site, also known as Linglong One.


However, this picture is a


relatively new one, which becomes clear when revisiting the Nuclear Engineering International archives. In June 1992, the ambitious plans held by the People’s Republic were reported upon, following the successful commissioning of the country’s very first nuclear power plant, Qinshan-1. Back in 1992, as Nei reported, China had already been developing its nuclear industry for 30 years and had succeeded in processing uranium ore, conducting enrichment, fuel fabrication and had made early progress on reprocessing. At the time, China had a nuclear capacity pipeline of some 15 GW based on PWR technology. Construction on its fuel fabrication plant had started in 1975 with foreign technical assistance and the first trial fuel assemblies had been produced by late 1984. Fuel for the 300MWe Qunshan-1 was manufactured in this facility at Yibin in Sichuan Province.


continued to develop its civil nuclear capabilities to become a key player in the international nuclear family, with much thanks to successive government plans lending significant support to it. Some of the plans did come to fruition, including building up a broad range of expertise across the many parts of the fuel cycle. Nevertheless, China is yet to become entirely independent as far as the front end is concerned. The 1992 article also makes significant references to the question of reprocessing and the use of fast reactors, which is an area where plans (including industrial reprocessing by 2015) have not progressed as far. Whilst a commitment to a closed fuel cycle remains, reprocessing facilities at a large scale are not yet available in-country. Equally, plans for fast reactors have not progressed as fast as the article anticipated, but construction of the Xiapu fast reactor pilot project did commence in 2017, with a second unit begining construction in 2020. China’s (and Russia’s)


increasingly dominant role in the future of nuclear energy didn’t garner much attention from the West initially, where nuclear languished in a state of limbo. However, the Trump administration identified the geopolitical implications that will follow from a Russian and Chinese-led expansion of nuclear in middle- and low-income countries and put nuclear R&D especially back on the political agenda. Nevertheless, these two countries have a significant head start in areas such as supply chain


and development, and before the outbreak of the Ukraine War a Russo-Chinese hegemony seemed all but certain. That’s clearly up in the air now, and we will have to see what the world will look like when the smoke clears. Irrespective of the long-term


imlications of the Ukraine conflict on Russian nuclear business, China continues to expand their nuclear fleet like clockwork. But despite this continued expansion, nuclear power is still only producing some 5% of China’s electricity, and only 2.25% of their total energy demand. However, with the potential to retrofit coal-fired power plants with reactors, there is a clear path for nuclear to achive considerably more in terms of its tota contribution to China’s energy balance. Indeed, this route may even see nuclear go as far as challenging coal’s seemingly unassailable position in sating China’s ever-growing energy demand. Nuclear could also prove to be the answer to the scourge of the country’s terrible air pollution. However, this would require a further ratcheting up of China’s nuclear ambitions. It’s clear from the Nuclear Engineering International archives that China has long harboured ambitions to become a major nuclear player with a full suite of domestic capabilities and that many of its plans have ultimately been realised. And, the ability of China’s command economy to rapidly pivot has been proven beyond doubt by the rapid expansion of renewables. The question is, where to next for the ‘Nuclear Dragon’? ■


China’s (and Russia’s) increasingly dominant role in the future of nuclear energy didn’t garner much attention from the West initially where nuclear languished


www.neimagazine.com | June 2022 | 13


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45