Left:


The bead bits turn brown when exposed to oxygen, making any tampering extremely obvious Source:


Sandia National Labs by Craig Fritz


Exploring alternative tamper detection The IAEA has been considering advancements in materials, technologies and machining techniques to develop a new type of seal. Now, following prototyping and testing, the Agency has adopted the Field Verifiable Passive Seal (FVPS). Made from aluminium and polycarbonate, each FVPS has a unique pattern of designs etched onto their surface to ensure that they cannot be replicated or replaced, as well as other tamper-indicating features. A device is used to verify the seal that employs


customised software and a specialised lens and light attachment to take three reference photos. When an inspector attaches a new seal, they use the dedicated software to input information about the seal location and application and this information together with the photos is relayed back to the IAEA. Inspecting the seal at a later date, the verification device is used to take photos for comparison with the reference photos to confirm the integrity of the seal. Unlike the CAPS seals, tamper verification can be done in the field. As with the CAPS seal, the FVPS also requires no tools to apply, no maintenance while deployed, and no batteries or electronics to power. “Having an in-field verification technique for the seal


means we have faster verification results, and we can reduce the administrative burden,” said Nicolette Seyffert, the new seal implementation project team member and Information Security Officer at the IAEA. “By having an in- field customised reader, it is immediately obvious if a seal was tampered with and removes the need to bring the seal back to the IAEA’s Headquarters in Vienna.” The new FVPS has been deployed for pilot use, with a planned expansion over the coming months before they eventually come to replace all of the traditional CAPS seals. Nonetheless, while emphasising that the IAEA is not a customer, Sandia’s scientists continued to pursue the research that had been underway for several years using the IAEA guidelines for these types of applications. Smartt explains: “We thought of the idea of visually obvious tamper indication six or seven years ago. It was a concept and we started studying different chemical formulations but having the idea that an inspector sees something that’s visually obvious is more immediately conclusive. We hope that it’s a safer approach because they can do their job more quickly.”


From visual concept to reality From this visual concept, the Sandia National Laboratories engineers developed a system based on “bruising” materials. The core of the colour-changing solution is a chemical called L-DOPA. Found in the human body, this


chemical can react with oxygen to make melanin which in humans is responsible for turning hair, skin and eyes their brown colour. The research team had explored several other colour- changing chemicals before determining that the melanin- producing reaction was the most practical. Using a few commercially available products, the team made puck- shaped security devices that quickly reveal a dark brown stain at the site of any damage, including when the wire loop that is threaded through them is removed. “In this system, water beads of different colours are blended to give a colour swirl as a unique visual indicator. The point of the unique identification is to mitigate the potential for counterfeiting. Those aren’t barcodes or QR codes, those are features with randomness that would be extremely difficult to counterfeit,” says Smartt. The water beads are commonly available throughout the world and while they are used to absorb water in this case they become saturated with L-DOPA. The particles also produce a mix of easily identifiable colours that can give a quick visual indication if the seal has been swapped or changed by taking a series of photographs for comparison. However, the Sandia approach doesn’t just rely on a visual comparison. As Corbin explains: “That [photo comparison] is the ideal scenario but that may not be possible in all applications, for instance it may not be possible to take a camera into certain facilities.” Once the seal has been damaged the chemical reaction


starts immediately and the colour change continues to spread as long as the damage allows oxygen to penetrate the seal. Cody says: “You can start seeing things within the hour,


if not faster but you can really see stuff within 24 hours when it’s very, very easily seen. It’s visibly obvious, that’s the key thing, and with the seal it’s just small, but with the enclosure, not only is tampering visibly obvious, but depending on the timing you could identify the attack location, which could be very useful to provide information potentially.” The time taken for assessment is also an important


characteristic. “There is that conclusive nature of the seal but also the rapid part. Inspectors have limited time in a facility and there are a lot of other activities they could do rather than spending time touching a seal and examining it,” Corbin says. It’s also important to note that even at 24 hours post


breach for an obvious indication of tampering, that is still far quicker than the CAPS system which involves sending it back to the IAEA to be examined.


www.neimagazine.com | May 2024 | 29


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53