SPECIAL REPORT | TAMPER DETECTION
A bruising encounter
Bruising materials can be used to reveal very visible evidence of tampering with nuclear storage casks, technologies or materials. Sandia National Laboratories lead researchers Heidi Smartt and Cody Corbin tell NEI how nuclear can show its battle scars
NUCLEAR REGULATORS AND AGENCIES ARE perennially concerned that the materials they are responsible for might be misused, lost or tampered with. Security is therefore a key issue but one that has seen little advancement over many decades. One of the main tools that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and others use to detect unauthorised access to nuclear materials and technology comes in the form of a coin-sized tamper indicating device. The IAEA and other treaty verification regimes use E-CAP
metal seal (CAPS) or metal cup seals. This is a general purpose, non-reusable copper and brass device used as a passive loop seal. To close the seal, a double copper cap is snapped onto the base. The metal base and its cap serve as the point of closure with a multistranded wire threaded between which encircles the item to be sealed. This device was developed in the 1960s and its still in use today. While they will reveal any evidence of potential criminal activity or tampering, they also present a number of challenges. Heidi Smartt explains the problem: “It’s a very simple
two-part metal cup seal to ensure that the item hasn’t been accessed without detection. To do a unique identifier on these seals they do a scratch and solder where they’ll solder inside the seal before they deploy it. They take
an image of it at IAEA headquarters and then when they remove the seal, whether that’s a few months or a few years later, they cut the wire, take it back to the IAEA, open it up and make sure it’s the same seal.” Smartt continues: “The metal cup seal is theoretically
cheap, it’s maybe a dollar for the material, but it can’t be verified in the field. That’s been the big issue as it actually costs the IAEA about two staff to examine these seals when they come back. They might look for things like some kind of sign of tamper, but it’s relatively subjective. So, they have to touch the seal, feel it, study it, see if there’s anything that worries them about the appearance.” According to the IAEA, in 2021, the Agency verified over
17,000 seals that had been applied to nuclear material, facility critical equipment or IAEA monitoring and other equipment at nuclear facilities. This clearly represents a substantial cost and, in response, the Agency has been looking for an alternative for some time. The goal is that the replacement has better tamper indication, better unique identifiers and can also be verified in the field. To that end the IAEA published a list of requirements for passive loop seals which the Sandia researchers used as the basis of their R&D programme.
Right: The coloured speckles in this prototype tamper-indicating device make it near-impossible to counterfeit, while the solution inside turns brown if the casing is cracked or the wire is pulled Source:
Sandia National Labs by Craig Fritz
28 | May 2024 |
www.neimagazine.com
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