A PATH FORWARD | WASTE MANAGEMENT


DOE has been unable to meet its contractual obligations to remove SNF from reactor sites for disposal because there is no disposal facility. This breach of contract has resulted in American taxpayers reimbursing nuclear plant owners for the continued costs of on-site storage, more than $12bnto date. Taxpayer liabilities will continue to grow until the DOE


is able to remove the fuel. Independent audits predict that around $40bn more will be paid in the future assuming that the DOE will be able to start taking used fuel in the fairly near future. This, the report observes, is impossible unless the government takes immediate action. Given that spent fuel will remain radioactive for millions


of years, it is essential that the nation find a permanent solution to dispose of this material. The report notes that the geographic magnitude of the problem is also large: there are 17 nuclear power plants permanently shut down, seven of which are completely decommissioned with only the spent fuel remaining, which prevents the reuse of these sites for many other purposes. In addition, all operating reactor sites have had to extend SNF storage facilities. The report makes a legislative proposal to fix the current


impasse and begin to develop a workable solution to the ongoing problem of nuclear waste disposal.


Creation of a new waste managment body The most important element to make progress on nuclear waste disposal in the US, says the report, is the establishment of a trusted, capable, properly-funded implementing organisation that can be successful. The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future


concluded in 2012 that a new organisation was necessary to manage spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, including establishing a geological repository for waste disposal. The basis of its conclusion, say the authors, was that the DOE would likely never be able to lead the country to the successful siting of a repository due to a lack of public trust and because it is continually subject to politics and focused on other priorities. The Commission concluded that only an implementer with a single focus of managing and disposing of the nation’s nuclear waste and control over needed finances would be able to develop the trust and have the necessary continuing focus needed to complete the job. Using overseas examples as models, the report panel


recommends that the US implementer should be a nuclear reactor owner-led Nuclear Corporation (NuCorp), operating either an independent public benefit corporation or a non-profit corporation. Under both models, the company is obligated to work towards a public benefit. NuCorp would be responsible for the management,


transportation, possible storage, preparation, and disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel, specifically all waste that is covered by the existing standard contracts under the NWPA. NuCorp would also be authorised to enter into disposal contracts with new reactor licensees, to dispose of spent fuel or high-level waste from their operations. Thus, new entrants into the reactor field could use NuCorp services to meet the NRC licensing requirement that they have disposal contracts in place. Should DOE or other federal government entities choose to use its services, NuCorp would also be obligated to contract for the disposal of such spent nuclear fuel or high-level waste, subject to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement with the federal government. The authors conclude that it would be mutually advantageous for DOE to contract with NuCorp for disposal services for the DOE’s SNF and HLW.


In accordance with applicable standards, NuCorp would


be responsible for siting, licensing, construction, operation, and decommissioning of a deep geologic repository or repositories. It would also be responsible for the transportation of SNF from reactor sites to storage facilities and a repository or repositories. Once the repository site(s) are permanently closed, responsibility for monitoring and long-term security would revert to the federal government. NuCorp would also be authorised to partner with private


recycling/reprocessing companies that may be interested in co-locating their facilities with NuCorp’s facilities, as long as they do not use the Nuclear Waste Fund monies. Such ventures would have to be supported by private investors. NuCorp’s financial needs will vary over time. There will be high financial needs when the repository is under construction and in operation, for instance. Thus, the report argues that NuCorp must also have assured access to funds when and where it needs them to complete its mission. Given that there is an existing Nuclear Waste Fund established by law and paid into by nuclear power plant operators, they indicate that NuCorp will need to acquire access to this fund. Initially, legislation should stipulate that interest earned on the Nuclear Waste Fund (currently approximately $1.8bn/ year) be transferred to NuCorp without need for further Congressional action. This proposed model needs to be a part of the national


debate and given serious consideration by Congress and the Executive Branch in fashioning a path forward. As progress is made, NuCorp would decide when and if it is necessary to reinstate an appropriate and reasonable Nuclear Waste Fee and would be given this authority by amendment to the NWPA. The amount of any future fee would be based on well- documented estimates of actual costs necessary to provide disposal services based upon the characteristics of the spent nuclear fuel or high-level waste requiring disposal.


www.neimagazine.com | February 2026 | 33


Below: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 identified Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the potential location for a deep geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high- level nuclear waste. Source: Bechtel


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