COVER STORY | SAFETY & SECURITY


A large range of events could result in the ‘islanding’ of nuclear sites from key systems and commodities. Source: US Government


contemporary world include natural phenomena such as Climate change; Biodiversity loss; Resource depletion; Pollution and toxification; Epidemics and pandemics, and; Demographic changes. Anthropogenic impacts may include Technological change (e.g., AI); Financial system instability; Inequality; Mis-/Dis-information; Political polarisation and unrest, and; Great power rivalry and conflict


Historical context There are many well-known historical events that arose from the realisation of systemic risk, with many of the most severe examples occurring from the industrial era onwards. As new technologies appeared and societies grew in magnitude, interconnectivity and complexity increased in turn, raising the scope for more severe disruptions, and for runaway polycrisis scenarios to become a more credible possibility. There has likely not been an historical event which could be described as a ‘true’ polycrisis at global scale, but several past events have exhibited characteristic escalating and compounding behaviours which could be described as ‘near-polycrisis’. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 is a key


recent example. In the years before the crisis, stresses built up through increasing global financial institution interdependencies, and the increasing prevalence of opaque financial instruments secured against risky loans – notably ‘subprime’ mortgages in the United States. The crisis was triggered by widespread loan defaults, the collapse of major financial institutions – famously Lehman Brothers, for example – and the rapidly escalating feedbacks between these events. Finance had become increasing networked and linked to all economic activity in the decades leading to these events, which made this a truly systemic crisis once it was triggered. Escalation to a full global polycrisis was only averted by rapid government interventions in the form of large financial bailouts, quantitative easing and interest rate reductions.


Systemic risk and the nuclear industry Systemic risk and its consequences are applicable to the global nuclear industry. The first step in demonstrating this is to contextualise this industry in systemic terms as a singular, coherent and discrete system. This is itself a complex system that is also deeply entangled with a range of other global-scale complex systems. The nuclear system comprises the aggregate of nuclear installations and their supporting technology and infrastructure that operates beyond national and other boundaries. It is a technological and organisational system made up of varied and deeply interconnected subsystems which provide key functions like highly specialised and specific materials, components,


people/skills, and data, operating at different scales, and nested within each other. This system operates within the wider socio-political-


technological global human system which comprises all parts of civilisation at global scale. This in turn operates within the Earth system comprising natural systems – the atmospheric, oceanic, and geologic systems, and the global biosphere – that underpin everything. At the smallest scales, the nuclear system comprises the nodes of nuclear technology themselves such as reactor and reprocessing sites, fuel fabrication and waste management facilities. At the wider scale is the dispersed infrastructure which underpins and supports nuclear technology such as mines, manufacturing facilities, data centres, and supply chains. At larger scales is the key supporting national infrastructure and institutions including power and water grids, treasuries, and regulatory bodies. And, at the largest scales is international governance and institutions that allow and coordinate the function of key global systems, such as the UN, IAEA, and WTO. The extensive interconnections, mutual dependencies and


reliance between the nuclear system and these other systems distributed nationally and globally is the origin of systemic risk in this context. Any failures, degradation or disruptions to the scope, nature or continuity of these supporting functions has scope to cascade into the key functions of the nuclear system, potentially affecting its ability to operate safely and efficiently. Systemic risks could apply through a large range of direct and indirect connections, arising from different vectors operating at different scales of time and space. The nuclear system is also distinct amongst technological systems in that it has inherent and unique vulnerabilities and exposures – as well as strengths and resiliencies – to systemic risks and potential future polycrisis scenarios. Features that could provide strengths and resiliencies to


systemic risks include the high integrity nature of nuclear infrastructure; systems, structures and components are designed and constructed to withstand underpinned design basis events. Similarly, quantified risk assessment frameworks, emergency planning and rigorous operating standards are enforced by competent regulators. Conversely, vulnerabilities and exposures include the very high complexity and non-fungibility of nuclear technology; systems, structures and components rely on specialised processes such as manufacturing that cannot be readily interchanged without impacting efficiency and safety. Furthermore, many nuclear facilities require active hazard management and continuous active supervision and interventions to prevent loss of control and containment of nuclear materials.


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