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| NEWS nuclear finance in peril French court warns


France’s Court of Auditors has urged the government and EDF to address many “uncertainties” before continuing their ambitious programme for the construction of new EPR nuclear reactors, noting that the financing remains unclear. The Court’s 97-page report said “the


accumulation of risks and constraints could lead to a failure of the EPR2 programme”, noting that the EPR of Flamanville in Normandy was only connected to the electricity grid in December 2024, 12 years behind schedule. The European Pressurised Reactor (EPR)


project, launched in 1992, was designed to relaunch nuclear power in Europe after the 1986 Chornobyl catastrophe in Soviet Ukraine. Construction began in 2007 at the Flamanville site – where two reactors had been operating since 1986 and 1987. However, the project was beset by a plethora of technical setbacks which saw costs soar from an initial estimate of €3.3bn to €19.3bn in 2015 and €22.6bn in 2023, “including financing cost”. In its latest report the court noted: “In reality, the total termination cost of Flamanville 3 is higher” reaching €20.4bn in 2015 and €23.7bn in 2023. EPRs are currently operating in China and


Finland. The first EPR began operating at China’s Taishan NPP with unit 1 beginning commercial operation in 2018 followed by Taishan 2 in September 2019, some five years behind schedule. Construction of Taishan 1 started in November 2009. The project was led by TNPJVC, a joint venture founded by CGN (51%), EDF (30%) and a regional Chinese utility Yuedian (19%). Construction of the EPR at unit 3 of Finland’s


Olkiluoto NPP began in 2005 and various setbacks and delays meant the plant was some 14 years behind the original schedule and significantly over budget. OL3’s final price tag was put at around $11bn ($12bn), three times the initial estimate. Two EPR units are currently under construction at Hinkley Point C in the UK. In 2022, French President Emmanuel


Macron said it was time time for a nuclear renaissance in France, adding that the operation of all existing reactors should be extended without compromising safety and proposing a programme for six new EPR2 reactors, with an option for a further eight to follow. The first three pairs of EPR2 reactors are to be built at the Penly, Gravelines and Bugey NPP sites, with construction expected to start in 2027. The original cost was put at €51.7bn ($53bn), but this was revised to €67.4bn in 2023. EDF is expected to make a final investment decision in 2026. EDF and Framatome are developing the EPR2


as a simplified version of the EPRs in France, Finland and the UK as well as those operating in China. The EPR2 is a pressurised water reactor


that meets the general safety objectives of the third generation of reactors. “The most worrying uncertainties relate


to the delays in the design of the EPR2, the unknown on the cost of the first three pairs [of reactors] and the lack of funding for the programme” the First President of the Court of Auditors, Pierre Moscovici told reporters. The Court’s earlier report in 2020 had highlighted multiple failures explaining the delays and additional costs of EPRs under construction or in operation. It recommended that EDF should “calculate the forecast profitability of the Flamanville 3 reactor and of the EPR2 and ensure its monitoring”. The latest report acknowledged that since


2020 “the context has changed significantly”. It added: “The nuclear industry is benefiting from a more favourable international context... A progress report on the nuclear sector and the implementation of the recommendations made by the court in 2020 is therefore necessary to assess the conditions for implementing this policy with considerable long-term challenges in financial, industrial, energy and environmental terms.” The Court noted that EDF has still not


provided a profitability forecast for the EPR2 programme, which means financing remains unclear. Even after the funding model is announced, there is likely to be a delay of at least a year while approval for state funding is sought from the European Commission. The programme “remains marked by a


delay in conception, an absence of a final estimate and a financing plan while EDF remains heavily indebted, the court issues a new recommendation: Withhold the final investment decision for the EPR2 programme until its financing is secured and the detailed design studies are progressing in line with the trajectory targeted for the milestone of the first nuclear concrete.” This step only began in 2024. The court recommended ensuring that “any


new international project in the nuclear field generates quantified gains and does not delay the schedule of the EPR2 programme in France”. It noted that in the UK EDF is confronted at the Hinkley Point C construction site with “a considerable increase in costs accompanied with a new delay of two years, and with a heavy financing constraint caused by the withdrawal of the Chinese co-shareholder”. Meanwhile, at the planned Sizewell C project, “delays are already accumulating, even before the investment decision has been taken”. The court recommended that EDF should not make a final investment decision on Sizewell C “before obtaining a significant reduction in sound financial exposure in Hinkey Point C”. ■


round up


POLICY


THE US TREASURY Department has added the Zaporizhia NPP (ZNPP), to its list of sanctioned Russian entities and individuals. ZNPP has been under Russian control since March 2022. The following September, the Zaporozhye Region voted to join Russia in a referendum that was not recognised by the US. Earlier in January the outgoing US administration imposed sanctions on more than 200 entities and individuals involved in Russia’s energy sector.


COMPANIES KAZAKHSTAN’S NATIONAL ATOMIC company. Kazatomprom, has announced an updated development strategy for the next 10 years, noting that its objectives for 2025-2034 are interdependent and complementary and will serve as a “fundamental guideline” for development. This is a continuation of the 10-year strategy which began in 2018 and which Kazatomprom has updated because of the early achievement of key strategic goals and fundamental changes in the industry.


FRANCE-BASED NUCLEAR start-up Naarea (Nuclear Abundant Affordable Resourceful Energy for All) has announced a strategic partnership with global energy management platform provider QGEMS. Naarea says the collaboration aims to integrate QGEMS’s advanced energy management system to optimise Naarea’s energy production and distribution (both electricity and heat), set to commence in 2025.


INDIA’S STATE-OWNED National Thermal Power Limited (NTPC) has signed a Supplementary Joint Venture Agreement-2 (SJVA-2) with the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). This builds upon an existing Joint Venture Agreement signed in 2010, and represents a strategic restructuring of their joint venture company, Anushakti Vidhyut Nigam Limited (ASHVINI). The amendments change the shareholding structure, with NPCIL now holding a 51% and NTPC retaining 49% in ASHVINI.


NUCLEAR FUEL BULGARIA’S KOZLODUY NUCLEAR Power Plant (NPP) has signed an agreement with US-based Westinghouse Electric to conduct a safety analysis for the licensing of an alternative nuclear fuel type for the plant’s Russian-designed VVER-1000 reactor at unit 6. Bulgaria’s Energy Ministry said the agreement ensures fuel diversification for unit 6 and follows Westinghouse’s delivery of the first reload of VVER-1000 fuel assemblies for Kozloduy’s unit 5 earlier in 2024.


www.neimagazine.com | February 2025 | 9


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