not obtained an instrument helicopter rat- ing. Of his total 2,278 hours of flight expe- rience, 2,070 were in airplanes. His 208 hours of helicopter time were equally divided between the Robinson R22, in which he’d completed his initial training, and the R44 he had bought in June 2020 to commute to work. His logbooks showed 30 of the 104 R44 hours in the preceding 90 days, with 19 of them recorded in the previous month.
The Helicopter NTSB investigators noted that the 2020- model helicopter “was not approved for flight in instrument meteorological condi- tions.” The NTSB’s probable- cause report and supporting documenta- tion didn’t specify the exact panel layout of the helicop- ter; however, R44s of that vintage are equipped with the minimal set of basic atti- tude instruments (including either electronic or gyro- scopic attitude and heading indicators), enabling an instrument pilot to maintain altitude and heading or execute a level 180-degree turn to escape from an inad- vertent entry into IMC. The post-crash fire consumed not only the cabin and fuselage, including the flight-control tubes, but also most of the tail cone and empennage. Although the crash destroyed the bladders and outer shells of the fuel tanks, the caps were secure and the finger strainers were clean and unobstructed. The main-rotor hub remained attached to its driveshaft, and damage to the main- and tail-rotor blades was ascribed to either initial impact during descent or first responders’ efforts during recovery operations. Damage to the engine, chiefly a sheared crankshaft-gear dowel pin, was attributed to impact forces. The NTSB con- cluded that “there was no evidence of any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation” of the airframe or the engine.
56 ROTOR SEPTEMBER 2023
The Takeaway Not surprisingly, the NTSB attributed the accident to
… the pilot’s inadequate preflight
weather planning, which resulted in an inadvertent encounter with instrument meteorological conditions at night, spatial disorientation, and collision with terrain. “VFR-into-IMC” accidents—those resulting from attempts to continue flying by visual references in instrument meteo- rological conditions—plagued aviation even before the first attempts to institute airmail services in the 1920s. It was a major reason life expectancy among those first airmail pilots was measured in weeks. VFR-into-IMC accidents typically end with
“VFR-into-IMC” accidents plagued aviation even before the first attempts to institute airmail services in the 1920s. It was a major reason life expectancy among those first airmail pilots was measured in weeks.
flight into terrain, either controlled (think collision with a ridgeline) or uncontrolled (think graveyard spiral). The chances of a lethal result are high either way. The invention of reliable attitude instru- ments and training programs to use them effectively have broadened the options available to both professional and non- occupational pilots, but these efforts haven’t begun to solve the problem. Combined across all aircraft categories and types of operations, about one-third of pilots involved in VFR-into-IMC acci- dents earned an instrument rating at some point but failed to use those skills effectively when they were most urgently needed. Two-thirds of VFR-into-IMC acci- dents are fatal, a figure that hasn’t changed much in at least the past 70 years. As a first cut, these accidents can be sorted into three distinct categories: those in which the pilots never learned to fly by
instrument references, those in which the pilot was qualified but the aircraft wasn’t appropriately equipped, and those in which an instrument-rated pilot failed to use those instruments to avoid catastrophe. Because relatively few helicopters are certificated for flight in instrument condi- tions and, consequently, relatively few helicopter pilots pursue the instrument rating, spatial disorientation accidents in rotorcraft largely fall into the first category. The present case is less straightforward: the pilot had enough instrument training to have successfully passed that check- ride—in an airplane—and the helicopter had enough instrumentation to enable him to maintain airspeed, alti- tude, and heading while requesting assistance from ATC. But instrument flight is a highly perishable skill dependent on consistent, recurrent practice. The pages of the pilot’s logbook recorded in the NTSB’s docket file begin in August 2020 and show no instru-
ment (or fixed-wing) flights during the eight months preceding the accident. It is therefore fair to suggest that he
was not only no longer legally current in, but also out of practice at instrument flight while also still relatively new to flying heli- copters. The combination of lost visibility in snow squalls and a dark, overcast night would have challenged both his instru- ment and his cyclic-and-collective skills in a low-altitude setting that left little margin for error either way.
Dark-night conditions are most pru- dently treated as effectively IMC, regard- less of reported ceilings or visibilities. In the end, this pilot’s crucial mistakes began with his failure to recognize and appreci- ate that the evening’s weather posed potentially lethal hazards. Neglecting to consider alternative routes or prepare for escape from unfavorable conditions left him with no options beyond hope once things began to go wrong.
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