14 passengers and a single pilot. For this flight, all but the two pilot seats had been removed to increase cargo capacity. The helicopter had also received a factory modi- fication boosting its 5-minute takeoff horsepower rating, making it a version commonly called the 212 HP. Additionally, in 2013 the 1973-model helicopter was
fitted with a Boundary Layer Research Aerospace FastFin system, a modification that involved reshaping the original vertical stabilizer and adding two tail-boom strakes to improve the efficiency of the tail rotor and thereby simultaneously increase hover performance while reducing pilot workload. As of Mar. 5, the helicop- ter had flown a total of 29,220 hours.
The Crew The operator’s revenue flights, including external loads, were normally flown by a single pilot. Two pilots were on board that day because the more senior, who served as pilot in command (PIC) on the ferry flight, planned to conduct a performance evaluation while the second pilot carried out the longline work. Both held commercial heli- copter licenses and were highly experienced in the Bell 212, the local environment, and overall. The PIC, who was the company president and opera- tions manager, had worked for the company for more than 20 years. He was also a Transport Canada–approved check pilot. His 9,125.5 hours of flight experience included 1,247 in the Bell 212, in which he had com- pleted recurrent training exactly one year earlier. His ini- tial mountain-flying training dated back to 2001, and he completed a refresher on Jan. 9, 2020. A pilot- proficiency check completed on Mar. 6, 2020, had cov- ered abnormal and emergency procedures that included 180-degree and hovering autorotations, engine fires, and engine, governor, hydraulic, and tail-rotor failures. His colleague had 5,756.5 hours of documented flight
experience, including 479.5 hours make-and-model. He had flown about six and a half years for the company. He obtained initial mountain-flying training in 2010 and com- pleted a refresher course on Jan. 22, 2021, followed by general recurrent training on Feb. 19 and a pilot- proficiency check on Feb. 24, 2021. Both had taken their company’s crew resource man- agement training on Oct. 26, 2020. Based on the pilots’ recorded work–rest schedules, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) concluded that performance was probably not impaired by fatigue.
The Weather
On the morning of the accident, a low-pressure center just north of Vancouver Island was moving inland. With
high pressure in the interior of British Columbia, the resulting steep pressure gradient produced gusty south- easterly winds. An associated cold front had been fore- cast to move through the vicinity of Bowen Island around 10 am. Moderate mechanical turbulence and low- level wind shear were anticipated below 3,000 ft., with turbulence expected to become severe in localized pockets. The area forecast issued by the Vancouver International Airport (CYVR) terminal called for ceilings at or above 6,000 ft. with good visibility and surface winds from 110 degrees at 18 kt., with gusts to 28 kt. Winds were forecast to ease to a steady 15 kt. after 11 am. The TSB report notes that the pilots spent consider- able time reviewing not only forecasts but also current observations from stations along their planned route, some of which gave them cause for concern. The 9 am reading at Pam Rocks, a few miles north of their route, cited winds from 130 degrees at 32 kt. with gusts to 45. The station at Point Atkinson, just to the southwest, doesn’t measure gusts but reported sustained winds of 30 kt. from 110 degrees. The PIC also contacted the BC Hydro crew at the site
for an update on conditions. While anticipating a rough ride, he decided to dispatch the flight in the expectation of improving conditions and a desire to keep the work on schedule.
The Flight The helicopter initially established cruise flight between 2,300 and 2,600 ft. above sea level, encountering vari- able easterly to southeasterly winds and light turbu- lence. The PIC was in the right seat; his colleague, in the left seat, was the pilot flying (PF). Approaching Keats Island, they noticed “cat’s paws”
waves produced by strong downdrafts on the surface of Howe Sound and discussed the prospect of increasing turbulence. The PF slowed the aircraft to 75-kt. airspeed and made a slight change of course to the north, but the pilots apparently didn’t consider climbing away from the ridge on Bowen Island and the mechanical turbulence that could be anticipated from strong southeasterly winds striking its face. Their cruising altitude of 2,600 ft. was only 212 ft. above the ridge’s highest point. Crossing Collingwood Channel at 2,560 ft., they encountered moderate turbulence and lost 130 ft. of alti- tude. Moments later, 2 nm west of the lee side of Bowen Island, the helicopter “violently pitched nose down and began a rapid right roll,” according to the TSB report, momentarily yanking the cyclic from the PF’s hand as the ship “rolled inverted, or close to inverted.”
DECEMBER 2022 ROTOR 53
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