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The global geopolitical landscape and its impact on security


T


he global geopolitical environment has entered a period of sustained instability, characterised by intensifying state power competition and the erosion of international norms, with growing convergence of political,


economic, cyber, and security risks.


Security threats are no longer confined to traditional state-on-state conflict but increasingly manifest through hybrid activity, grey-zone warfare, economic coercion, influence operations, cyber intrusion, and civil disruption. These dynamics directly affect national resilience, critical infrastructure, public trust, and the operating environment for both public and private security actors.


Hostile state activity and strategic ambiguity


A defining feature of the current environment is the growing assertiveness of hostile and/or competitor states operating below the threshold of open conflict.


China’s activities exemplify this trend. UK government assessments have attributed malicious cyber activity to China-linked actors, including attempts to target democratic institutions and


parliamentarians. These actions form part of a broader pattern of influence operations, espionage, and strategic positioning. As an example, the proposed construction of a large Chinese embassy at Royal Mint Court in London illustrates how geopolitical competition can translate into tangible domestic security concerns.


In my view, the site’s proximity to critical infrastructure, communications networks and fibre-optic routes raises legitimate questions regarding surveillance, intelligence gathering, and long-term strategic intent. Compounding the issue is the perceived inconsistency in the UK government’s approach to China.


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While acknowledging China as a strategic competitor, the government has at times stopped short of formally designating it as a national security threat, creating legal and operational ambiguity. The collapse of high-profile espionage cases (Cash and Berry) on technical grounds has reinforced public and political concern that economic and diplomatic considerations may be diluting security essentials.


Such ambiguity undermines confidence in the robustness of the UK’s national security framework.


Public trust, social stability, and civil unrest


Geopolitical decisions increasingly carry social and reputational consequences.


Public awareness of hostile state activity is high, while trust in institutional decision- making remains fragile. Where security concerns are perceived to be subordinated to trade or diplomatic convenience, public backlash is likely. This contributes to elevated levels of protest activity, activist campaigning, media scrutiny, and scepticism toward established institutions. Diaspora communities, journalists, activists, and political dissidents may feel particularly exposed, especially where fears of surveillance or foreign intimidation arise.


These concerns exacerbate existing social fragmentation. In high-profile


developments linked to fossil fuels, foreign investment, or areas of global conflict, protests and public disorder become more likely, placing additional strain on policing and private security resources.


For organisations operating in this environment, reputational exposure is a critical risk. Perceived proximity to hostile- state interests whether through commercial partnerships, property ownership, or service provision can trigger activist attention and public criticism, regardless of actual intent or operational involvement.


© CITY SECURITY MAGAZINE – SPRING 2026 www.citysecuritymagazine.com


Economic and infrastructure security risks


The geopolitical climate is also reshaping economic and infrastructure risk. Intellectual property theft, data compromise, and cyber-enabled economic espionage are persistent threats to universities, technology firms, financial institutions, and property assets. As hostile-state activity becomes more sophisticated, the distinction between cybercrime, espionage, and state- sponsored action continues to blur.


London’s commercial property sector illustrates this convergence of risk. Increased investment from foreign, state- linked entities introduces not only financial considerations but also security implications. High-profile buildings housing international tenants, sensitive data, or financial operations may become symbolic or physical targets during periods of heightened geopolitical tension, with damage from protest and direct action now a near-daily occurrence across the city.


It comes as no surprise that the financial sector is a leading voice in the risks faced as we move deeper into digital dependency. Critical functions are increasingly dependent on a small number of global IT providers, especially non- European cloud, and AI vendors. As we have seen, a failure at a single provider can impact multiple organisations simultaneously.


Our drive for ever more efficiency and innovation has created a concentrated risk; a single cloud or software outage can trigger broad simultaneous failure, not isolated disruption. Amazon, Jaguar Land Rover, M&S, NHS Ireland, and Gatwick, just some examples where interruption through either hostile or accidental impacts has caused huge, international and localised disruption owing to their business reliance on digital functionality.


These incidents demonstrate the possible impact for private security, where CCTV


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