TROUBLESPOT Q
Organizational change In October, the company underwent significant organizational changes. The nautical inspector
who had been the lead on the preparation of Maersk Shipper and Maersk Searcher’s towing operation was made redundant. As a result of a management decision, the laid-off employees had to leave their workplace immediately. The marine superintendent asked if he could hand over his current work task, but due to the organizational change process this was not possible. Therefore, he could not inform his colleagues that the towing procedure was still in draft or explain outstanding missing items. Later in October, the company underwent a
second organizational change, which imposed a large-scale rotation among the employees as a result of the merging fleet teams. As a result of the merger, the employees in the operations team managing the vessels based in Europe were moved to other sections. During late October and early November, a handover of all current affairs to the new European operations
team – including the towing operation of Maersk Shipper and Maersk Searcher on standby – took place. In early December, the towing operation
was resumed. It had been decided that the anchor handler Maersk Battler should conduct the move to Aliaga. The new operations team did not evaluate the towing set-up as this was considered approved months earlier. At the handover during the organizational
change, they had been informed that the preparation of the towing set-up had been concluded and approved, and that the towing operation was ready to be executed.
Deteriorating weather Maersk Battler departed Fredericia on 12
December 2016 at approximately 11:30 and the towage exited the port area and proceeded to the Skaw Roads. The weather was clear and the two ships under tow were lying steady in the water next to each other. On 20 December, the swell increased as the
towage was proceeding through the English Channel. The weather conditions were not unusual for that time of year and were not considered problematic. To adapt to the weather conditions, the main tow wire was paid out to 630m. The crew noticed that the fenders
keeping the towed ships apart had vanished. Maersk Searcher and Maersk Shipper had
direct contact, but were steady in the water. As both vessels were to be recycled, it was not considered a problem that the ships suffered
The vessels listed towards each other, after hours of damaging contact
slight damage above the waterline when making contact. However, the master decided that, when the towage reached sheltered waters
in the Mediterranean, some crew members on Maersk Battler were to board the vessels and inspect them. Due to the sea state in the English Channel and in the Bay of Biscay, launching the rescue boats and boarding the ships on tow imposed too great a danger. On 21 December, the weather deteriorated
and the towage was affected by a westerly 4.5m swell. At dawn, the crew could see that, during the night, both ships had suffered contact damage, primarily to the superstructures, and that they were no longer lying steady in the water. Both vessels rolled and showed a
tendency to list towards each other, especially Maersk Searcher. On the night of 21 December, the master was
on duty on the bridge along with a watch- keeping able seaman (AB). At 23:25, the AB suddenly noticed that Maersk Searcher was lying deeper in the water than before and was listing heavily. He communicated this observation to the master, who immediately realized that the vessel was about to capsize.
Ten minutes after the AB made this observation, Maersk Searcher capsized. All crew members were called to the bridge.
It was evident that Maersk Searcher would sink and drag Maersk Shipper down as well.
The master informed the company’s emergency team and the French Coast Guard of
the loss of the two ships. At 06:07, Maersk Shipper sank. The master decided that it was too dangerous for the crew to cut the towing wire on deck. Instead, the master carried out a controlled breakage of the main towing wire, by going forward on the main engines with a pull force greater than the wire could withstand.
Report conclusions The crew on Maersk Battler did not perceive the
direct contact between Maersk Searcher and Maersk Shipper as an emergency situation. They expected that the fenders of the side-by- side towing set-up could fail during the tow and that the ships under tow would suffer some damage to the accommodation, but, as they were to be recycled, damage above the waterline was accepted. The cause of the capsizing and foundering of
Maersk Searcher and Maersk Shipper might seem simply to be the result of two ships being allowed to collide multiple times and a wrong choice of towing method. However, this assumption is oversimplified. Instead, this accident calls for understanding of the complex circumstances of the lengthy preparation process during a period of organizational changes, which resulted in the decision to use an unconventional towing method.
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