as soon as possible, to avoid any potential contamination. Eventually, 6,000 domestic pigs were culled. Trade partners outside the European Union responded quick- ly to the news. A range of non-EU countries closed their bor- ders to Belgian pork or at least some of its by-products, in- cluding pork-loving nations like China, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan. Inside the EU, in line with rules of compartmentalisation, the discovery did not directly affect trade as pig and pork ship- ments could continue as usual. Nevertheless, understandably, Belgian pigs were not rewarded with top prices as the pork could not be exported to major markets outside the EU. That meant that Belgium’s pig prices did suffer. In a few weeks, fin- isher pig prices at the Belgian Pork Group dropped from € 1.36/kg to € 1.09/kg dead weight. On farm, that translated into lower income. For instance, a Belgian farmer sending 1,000 finisher pigs to slaughter every month explained early in 2019 that he missed out on € 5,000/month because of the situation. (The bad price situation lasted until March 2019, when Bel- gium experienced being on the other side of ASF. Due to the presence of the virus in Asia, demand for pork soared globally and prices elsewhere – including Belgium – increased.)
How did the virus get in? One of the major mysteries around the outbreaks of ASF is how the virus actually got in. After all, the nearest outbreaks were hundreds if not thousands of kilometres away. In short, three theories are suggested as to how the virus entered the country – not surprisingly, they all revolve around human be- haviour. None of the theories below has been proved. The most well-known explanation is that a truck driver who had had enough of his (infected) ham sandwich threw it out of the window. Another explanation going around, after some arrests were made, was that certain members of Brussels high society would sometimes illegally smuggle wild boar in from Eastern Europe and release them in southern Belgium for hunting purposes. A third explanation related to the military camp site Lagland. Members of the army might have imported the virus when doing exercises in the Baltic States, where ASF is also preva- lent. Various cases of ASF-infected wild boar were found within the camp site’s premises.
How to eradicate the virus? Even though it still is not clear how the virus got in, there was a pathway to eradicate it. This was shown to be possible by the Czech Republic, the only country in recent years that has fully eradicated an ASF outbreak and where this has been acknowledged. The Czech authorities followed the strict EU guidelines on how to deal with the outbreaks around the city Zlín. It comes
Many kilometres of fencing were installed, like here near Léglise, to make sure that the ASF outbreak in wild boar could be contained.
down to a lot of testing, intelligent hunting, cooperation and total transparency. Normally, after an outbreak, a subdivision is made between an “infected zone” and a “surveillance zone”. With the use of fences, first there is an attempt to stabilise the situation. It is essential that the virus cannot move, which is why the centre of the area should not be attacked by shoot- ers immediately. This may lead to a situation where the wild boar attempt to flee, risking a further spread. In the heart of the infected area with the highest risk, about 115ha of fields were left unharvested on purpose, providing both food and shelter for the wild boar. In the meantime, in the areas surrounding this zone, intelligent and intensive hunting took place, so that the chance of sick wild boar in- fecting others in outer zones would be minimal. Once that area was “clean”, the hunters went inside the zone with high risk and killed the last remaining wild boar. The last positive case was found on 19 April 2017 in a carcass that had been dead for months.
When the virus was gone for one year, administrative wheels started spinning to give back the Czech Republic its status “free from ASF”. Eventually, the European Commission grant- ed this status in spring 2019. In the end, in the 11 months the virus was present, no domestic pigs had been affected in the Czech Republic, and between 220 and 230 wild boar had died of the virus.
▶PIG PROGRESS | Volume 36, No. 6, 2020 9
PHOTO: TWAN WIERMANS
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