Assembly, or of a coalition if the largest party does not command a majority. ODM obviously commanded a majority and Raila Odinga became the Prime Minister. On the basis of 50/50 sharing of positions, the Accord also provided for positions of two Deputy Prime Ministers appointed by each member of the coalition and a cabinet on the 50/50 formula. But this was not without
ranchor: the 50/50 formula translated as a quantity by our PNU partners while in ODM it was interpreted in both numbers and “weight” of cabinet portfolios. This dissonance persists even where the National Accord underlines that the “composition of the coalition government shall at times reflect the relative parliamentary strength of the respective parties and shall at all times take into account the principle of portfolio balance”. Today, we are faced with an uncomfortable situation where the Leader of Government Business in the House is the Speaker of the National Assembely who chairs the House Business Committee, a place traditionally reserved for a Member of the executive. The logic of coalition would have determined that since the Prime Minister is the leader of the majorioty party in Parliament and the “cordinator and supervisor’ of government functions he would automatically succeed as the Leader of Government Business in the House. The disagreement over
interpreting the meaning of power- sharing has gone off the radar but remains real as it often threatens the stability of the coalition when suspicions rein over senior public and civil service government appointments. Generally, this is one issue that has continued to threaten instability in the coalition. At the heart of the instability is the multiple interpretations of the National Accord as enshrined in the constitution vis-à-vis other
constitutional provisions that would suggest that the President alone retains the constitutional mandate as the country’s Chief Executive. This has been clearely
effect of undermining cohesion in decision-making in the grand coalition. Arguably, elements within the system have taken advantage of such hiccups to fuel suspicions
political parties. The reform agenda itself, the 2012 succession politics, and the design for a new constitution have become flashpoints on which inter - and
demonstrated in administrative hiccups of the new executive structure that emerged when the Office of the Prime Minister and that of the Head of the Public Service and the Secretary to the Cabinet clashed over overlaping roles. The new power structure also created conflicts over protocol. Despite the Accord providing that the President and Prime Minister were to share powers equally, protocol wars emerged on who between the Prime Minister and Vice-President was senior to the other. All these have had the net
12 | The Parliamentarian | 2010: Issue Three - Kenya
and mistrust in an attempt to derail the reform agenda.
Party divisions Factionalism within both PNU and ODM has also created multiple sub-parties within the main parties. This is due to several reasons, notably ethno-regional pressure for political and economic rewards from either of the two partners depending on perceived levels of support during the 2007 elections. Ethnic and sub-ethnic interests built around advancing their political interests have become the basis for further conflicts within
intra-party divisions revolve. These multiple divisions have affected inter- and intra-party cohesion with politicians forming transitory but politically explosive cross-party alliances for personal or regional interests. Indeed, intra-party factionalism persists due to lack of the institutionalization of political parties despite the enactment of the Political Parties Act (2007). At its worst, inter- and intra- party factionalism has affected the creation of bi-partisan consensus and support for the government agenda in Parliament. Political wars for supremacy within political