government would be to carry out major reforms buttressed by a comprehensive constitutional review.
I was first elected to Parliament
in 1989 and have served in six cabinet portfolios including a short
Tenets of power-sharing Ordinarily, power-sharing is usually
implementation of power-sharing in the context of the rationale which led to the formation of a coalition government?
of the crisis and prevent its recurrence. For power-sharing between warring and suspicious coalition partners to be effective, irrevocable arrangements in which power is shared have to be adopted to
threat for society to relapse into the chaotic violence that a coalition like Kenya’s was trying to stem. In truth, the tensions that have griped the ODM-PNU coalition have been so tenuous that it is the reliance of Kenyans – and hope for a new beginning – that has ensured we continue to soldier on.
The clock tower and garden in the Kenya Parliament .
Our coalition has, again, been largely maintained through the disposition of the two principals – President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila. The usual
stint as Vice-President of the Republic. In my parliamentary career, I have served as the Deputy and Leader of Government Business. I was the running mate to the current Prime Minister, Rt Hon. Raila Odinga, under the ODM in the 2007 elections, and retain the position of the Deputy Party Leader. In the thick of the disputed elections announced by the then Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) and the crisis that followed, I was chosen by the ODM to lead our team into the Kofi Annan-led mediation – what became known as the “Serena Talks”. I now serve as the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Local Government, and I am still a member of the “Serena” National Accord implementation mechanism.
How has this unique
experiment in coalition government in Africa, born out of crisis, worked in Kenya, especially in the
recommended as a mechanism for promoting stability in deeply fragmented societies. In most cases, it is borne out of normal electoral processes where one political party is unable to garner a majority to govern on its own. In most democracies, such coalitions are provided for in the constitution. These are usually “coalitions of the willing”.
Ours has been unique in that it brought together “the desperate unwilling” into a “transitional government” with a specific mandate and timeframe. In terms of constitutionality, one could say the current coalition government “forced” itself into the constitution. Conceptually, a coalition is formed for the purpose of unifying all groups to protect and promote national interests.
Ours had one overriding national interest – reform – to address the fundamental causes
guarantee stability of the coalition. This then is guaranteed by political will to compromise, consult and negotiate as key elements of sustainability. Unity of purpose in agenda-setting for mandate fulfilment that transcends ethnic and personal differences is critical in fragile coalitions as has been the case in Kenya. Trust between the coalition partners and commitment to set policy become the driving force of a “transitional coalition” that is Kenya’s. However, my experience so far has taught me that power-sharing agreements without supportive institutions have many adverse consequences for governance, not least that they are most likely to facilitate lack of accommodation among diverse ethno-political groups, making coalitions unsuitable in attempts to achieve legitimacy and stability. The worst case scenario is the constant
maintenance of a coalition through creation of structured mechanisms for building consensus and general consultations to ensure that relevant policies, laws and reforms have bi-partisan support have been haphazard, and at times sabotaged. For instance, an agreement between the parties to spell out the mode of operation and interaction never saw the light of day. Instead, we have operated as if we are one entity, despite obvious frailty and fissures. Kenya’s Grand Coalition government was formed not as an end in itself but as a means to an end – carrying out reforms in areas including those that had led to the 2007 post-election violence. These reforms would be wide ranging to prevent the future recurrence of inter-communal violence prompted by disharmony in the social, economic and political equilibrium. How then have we managed the implementation of power-sharing under the life of the coalition government?
Power-sharing in the coalition The National Accord provided for the Prime Minister’s position to “supervise and co-ordinate execution of the functions of and affairs of the government” as an “equal” partner or “co-principal” in the running of the government with the President . The Prime Minister would be an elected Member of the National Assembly and the Parliamentary Leader of the largest party in the National
The Parliamentarian | 2010: Issue Three - Kenya | 11