(nine have been either Leaders of the Opposition or Shadow Treasurers). This is a record, as far as I am
aware, unrivalled by any other Australian jurisdiction. It is also worth noting that the
current majority government has observed the convention that the Deputy Speaker be a member of the Opposition despite having the num- bers to award both the speakership and deputy speakership to govern- ment members. Eschewing a “winner takes all”
approach can also be viewed as inherently democratic and I would suggest that conventions such as these form important benchmarks
external pressure being exerted on a Member to vote for a particular candidate (although this claim could be equally true for all plenary votes and indeed an inherent part of a pluralist, democratic process, involves the application of pressure on elected representatives to cast their votes in particular ways by constituents and interest groups). The counter-argument is that the
public has a right to know how MLAs vote in all aspects of their public duty, and by making ballots secret means that Members do not have to account to their constituents for their decisions. It is also the case that an MLA could use the secret ballot to vote contrary to their public
should the A.C.T. be able to imple- ment changes that provide greater control for the legislature in deter- mining its budget, the Assembly would substantially improve its dem- ocratic credentials and give more ful- some expression to the separation of powers doctrine. I believe that addressing this area
of concern would bolster the A.C.T.’s performance to an “A” grade vis-à-vis the benchmarks notwithstanding some of the other areas of non- or semi-compliance that I have touched upon. While these other areas of incom- plete or non-compliance need to be given further consideration and will involve further discussion, I do not
The outside of the A.C.T. Legislative Assembly.
with which to assess the democratic character of a legislature.
Public votes
Benchmark 2.6.1 states that, “Plenary votes in the legislature shall be public”.
This benchmark is generally
observed at the Assembly. However, there are a number of exceptions. The election of the Speaker, Deputy Speaker and Chief Minister at the commencement of a new Assembly, which while taking place as a public proceeding, is conducted by secret ballot and means that the voting records of individual members can- not be publicly known. There are arguments for and
against secret ballots. One argument is that a secret ballot alleviates any
pronouncements on the issue. For example, a Member could indicate public support for a politically popu- lar candidate for Speaker but, for whatever reason, hide behind the secret ballot to vote for an undis- closed political ally. This lack of transparency has the potential to thwart accountability.
Conclusion While the A.C.T. Legislative Assembly does perform to a high standard against the benchmarks set out by the Study Group, there is still room for improvement.The main area which I believe requires imme- diate attention is benchmark 6.1.2 concerning the legislature’s budget development and decision-making. In this regard, it is my view that
308 The Parliamentarian 2008/Issue Four
believe that they fundamentally undermine the democratic character of the A.C.T.
References
1 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Study Group (2006). Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures p8.
2 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Commonwealth Legal Education Association, Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges Association, Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association, Commonwealth Secretariat (2004). Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Three Branches of Government p22.